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ABSTRACT 
"I HAD AL WAYS BEEN OPPOSED TO COLONIALISM" 
President Harry S. Truman and the End of European Colonialism 
Timothy J. Pifer 
August 7, 2008 
This thesis is a biographical and historiographical examination of Truman's rhetoric 
and handling of colonialism. Truman's position regarding European colonialism is a 
worthy topic since it facilitates the study of the United States' treatment of people in 
underdeveloped countries and allows insight into Truman's beliefs. The research 
methodology and references used for the paper include primary sources drawn principally 
from the Truman Presidential Library as well as numerous secondary sources relating to 
Truman's Presidency. 
The focus of analysis is on Truman and his administration's oratory and diplomatic 
decisions regarding colonial issues. The findings show that Truman demonstrated 
through both his public and private communications that he opposed colonialism. 
Furthermore, the bulk of the foreign policy decisions made by Truman's administration 
showed a tendency to oppose colonialism. Nonetheless, Truman aided French efforts to 
reestablish control over former colonies in Indochina and this deviation undennined his 
otherwise anti-colonial legacy for future generations. 
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The primary objective ofthis paper is to provide a biographical and historiographical 
examination of Harry S. Truman's (HST) leadership on the issue of European 
colonialism during the earliest period of the late twentieth century global contest called 
the Cold War. Truman's stance on European colonialism is a worthy topic of 
examination since it facilitates an understanding of actions undertaken by his 
administration and allows insight into the complex character of Truman. This 
understanding remains relevant since the ramifications of the Truman White House's 
actions regarding former colonies at the end of World War Two still impact people in 
Asia, the Middle East, Africa and other parts of the world. Equally important, a grasp of 
Truman's actual or de facto policy on colonial rule is critical to any historical study of the 
United States' treatment of the people in underdeveloped countries. This paper seeks to 
answer the following questions: Did Truman have a consistent foreign policy on the 
issue of Europe's external colonies? Did Truman consider European control of 
underdeveloped countries as natural or did he see it as exploitation of native peoples? 
Did he ever touch on the issue of colonial rule in public speeches or private 
correspondence? Lastly, did his private beliefs coincide with his administration's 
practice of foreign affairs? 
This paper considers these questions and suggests that Truman was hostile to any form 
of colonial rule, including the variety practiced by the major powers of Europe. The 
thesis of this paper is that Truman demonstrated through both his public and private 
communications that he opposed colonialism. Furthermore, the bulk of the foreign policy 
decisions made by Truman's administration showed a clear tendency to oppose 
colonialism. Nonetheless, Truman aided French efforts to reestablish control over former 
colonies in Indochina and this deviation undermined his otherwise anti-colonial legacy 
for future generations. 
The paper examines the following ideas in order to validate the thesis. First, that 
Truman stated while in and out of office that he opposed the concept of empires ruling 
other lands and peoples. He made the point that colonialism was contrary to his basic 
beliefs and his personal values as an American. Furthermore, Truman's anti-colonial 
stance mirrored the position ofthe late Franklin O. Roosevelt (FOR) who had held a 
deep-seated opposition to European colonialism, particularly as practiced by the British 
Empire. Another facet to consider was that Truman's attitude also seemed to reflect the 
American ideal of free trade across international borders and the unfettered movement of 
capital. Truman's stand against colonial governance remained firm though later in his 
administration it evolved into a form that would fit with his anti-Communist language. 
Second, while Truman personally opposed colonial control his administration's 
foreign policy approach lacked consistency. At the beginning of his tenure, Truman's 
rhetoric took aim at empires and their involuntary control of other regions of the world. 
Simultaneously, the nation's foreign policy opposed European colonialism and included 
this worldview into the foundation of the new United Nations in the form of trusteeship. 
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However, over time, Truman and his key people's bureaucratic strategy evolved in such a 
way that they ended up supporting the European powers, and their imperial systems, 
which they had previously opposed. The paper will show the basis for this turnabout was 
another foreign policy concern, the growing fear of a new imperialism in the guise of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). 
The research methodology and references used for the paper include primary and 
secondary sources related to the questions about Truman and postwar colonialism. The 
focus of the analysis is on the administration's assessments and incentives concerning 
colonial issues within the context of the major foreign policy themes of the day, namely 
the post-Second World War global instability and the onset of the Cold War. Another 
focal point of the analysis is Truman's personal and public position on colonialism and 
the impact that had upon the overall administration's policy. The Truman Presidential 
Library & Museum's archives in Independence, Missouri provided the bulk of primary 
sources used in this analysis. The library resources include Presidential copies of 
estimates and intelligence reports from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the 
National Security Agency (NSA) and the State Department. The library's vast collection 
of oral interviews provided personal observations from people involved with, or 
influenced by, the Truman administration's various strategies and conceptual planning 
efforts. Truman's own words were available from his memoir drafts, copies of speeches, 
logs from press conferences, and private letters. In addition to the material from the 
Truman Library, period news articles, books published during that time and shortly after 
Truman left office, and Dean Acheson's published memoir round out the primary 
sources. Secondary sources relied first upon Truman biographies, such as Robert 
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Ferrell's Harry S. Truman: A Life,' Alonzo Hamby's Man of the People: A Life of Harry 
S. Truman,2 and David McCullough's Truman3 for contextual information on the man 
and the times. Building upon this foundation was the examination of a number of Cold 
War histories and several existing academic theses, relating to the Truman 
administration, the United States' involvement in Vietnam, colonialism and 
decolonization in the postwar period. These primary and secondary sources provide an 
examination of Truman, the man, and Truman, the President, during a transitional 
administration, which oversaw the passing of the old European order and the 
development of a new equilibrium in foreign affairs. 
COLONIAL RULE 
Before proceeding further, the following discussion will help establish a common 
definition of colonial rule as applied to Truman's position on the issue of European 
colonialism. First, the terms colonialism and imperialism are interchangeable for the 
purpose of this paper when discussing the postwar European empires.4 A 1972 article on 
cultural geography by Michigan State Professor Ronald J. Horvath says "It seems 
generally ... agreed that colonialism is a form of domination-the control by individuals or 
groups over the territory and/or behavior of other individuals or groups. (Colonialism has 
also been seen as a form of exploitation, with emphasis on economic variables ... ).,,5 
Thus, this definition would include the safeguarding of closed markets and natural 
resources from outside nations as described by the popular historian and prolific author 
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Walter LaFeber.6 The system used by the European powers at the end of the nineteenth 
century was one of extracting natural resources from the colonies, using that material to 
produce manufactured products and then selling those goods back to the colonies or to 
other nations. This system involved a large portion of the world's population and the 
European nations who had empires were especially active in the arena of world affairs. 
What today may seem like an archaic and outmoded system did not seem so 
antiquated in the mid-twentieth century. During this period, the European empires 
controlled over twenty percent of the world's land mass and a large share of the world's 
economy.7 Despite the large geographic areas concerned, the colonial control, or 
imperialism, practiced by the Europeans involved few settlers from the homeland 
residing permanently in the colony. Nevertheless, the European nations wielded almost 
unlimited control over the governmental and economic affairs of their colonies by means 
of an imperial administration managed from the motherland's capital in Europe or 
England.8 This external control over the colonies' indigenous people also increased the 
power of the European nations in ways other than economic. One example was the use 
of colonial troops in both World Wars to augment the European nations' power. The 
additional work force available to the European combatants is one reason the conflicts 
were able to go global.9 Other aspects that increased the empire's power included the 
ability to base land and naval forces around the world, which increased the global 
influence of the Europeans. Moreover, the historic rivalries that existed between the 
European empires produced tensions that increased the odds of direct confrontation. 
Since the colonies caused these clashes, and provided the men to tight them, they, in turn, 
would be a factor in any foreign affair equation. 10 
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From the end of the First World War to the end of the Second World War, the colonial 
empires of Europe were at their most extensive and covered a large part of the globe. I I 
The British Empire had by far the largest group of colonies and its size recalls the well-
known adage; "an empire on which the sun never sets.,,12 In fact, by the end of the 
Second World War the British Empire and Commonwealth included more than sixty 
nations around the world.13 Even in the economically troubled period after the Second 
World War the Britain Empire was still important, producing worldwide " ... almost a 
quarter of all manufactured exports in 1950.,,14 For these reasons when the United States 
government focused on the subject of colonialism in the 1930s, 40s and 50s, they were 




The foreign affairs focused historiographical interpretation of the larger field of Cold 
War history is well established. Throughout the various accounts of the Cold War, the 
central question has been; which faction was primarily responsible for the development 
of the conflict? The answer to this query has resulted in different schools of thought. 
Historians Arthur Schlesinger, Herbert Feis and Louis Halle gave rise to the first school's 
interpretation. l Their belief was that during the early postwar period, before the start of 
the Cold War, the United States' foreign policy was passive in nature2 and focused on 
efforts such as the establishment of the United Nations' trusteeship program. This early 
school maintains that despite the United States' best efforts to befriend the Russians, the 
USSR-United States conflict was unavoidable. This traditional view also argues that the 
Soviet Union precipitated the Cold War because of their aggressive attitude and empire 
building. These ideas were dominant until the late 1950s and the advent of the Vietnam 
War. Younger historians then started to disagree with that analysis and began to place 
the blame in large part on America's efforts to establish a United States-friendly world 
economic hegemony. William Appleman Williams3 led the newer school of thought and 
its champion was Walter LaFeber.4 This school's analysis argues that the Russians were 
too weak after the Second World War to be a credible threat to the United States and 
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therefore could not have drawn the United States into the Cold War. These Cold War 
revisionists also portray the Roosevelt and Truman administrations as less than 
committed to universalism, the idea that nations should work together for the common 
good of humanity. Instead, the revisionists assert that the motivation for both 
administrations was self-interest and that they pursued their goals at the expense of other 
nations.5 A later group of historians, led by John Lewis Gaddis and sometimes described 
as the Post-revisionism school, proposed yet another interpretation of events.6 Gaddis' 
view is, in some ways, a blend of the previous schools with America's world economic 
hegemony efforts being more benign and defensive in nature rather than domineering. 7 
This latest school seeks to establish a balance and places the blame for starting the Cold 
War on both the United States and USSR. Moreover, Gaddis points out that, for one, 
FDR placed the winning of the war and protecting the postwar alliance above all other 
foreign policy considerations to include anti-colonialism.s These schools of thought also 
include other suppositions on the nature of the Cold War but the theories described here 
seem to be the most relevant to the subject of colonialism and America's subsequent 
foreign policy. 
No unified body of work or specific school of study exists that analyzes Truman's 
position on the issue of colonialism. Therefore, it is impossible to ascertain cohesive 
trends or contrasting theories based on exclusive publications concerning Truman and 
colonialism in the postwar era. Instead, this historiographical analysis draws from 
literature concerning the period, associated subjects, and people that were involved in the 
ongoing events. This analysis groups together related books and articles to allow the 
review of theories and trends that may be occurring throughout the literature. This 
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historiographical review begins with a focus on Truman and the published works 
highlighting his life. 
The review begins by focusing on an examination of some of the foremost and best-
known Truman biographies to gain an understanding of how Truman's administration 
related to European colonialism and to look for clues regarding his personal stance on the 
subject. Overall, these biographies provide similar accounts concerning Truman's 
attitudes though they offer varying perspectives on parallel events. McCullough's 
mainstream biography is typical of the others in the sense that he does not deal directly 
with the issue of Truman's personal vision of colonialism or decolonization. Rather, the 
popular biographer discusses the various crises and ordeals that surrounds the decay of 
the European empires and describes how Truman mentally approaches such problems. In 
particular, McCullough discusses the birth ofthe United Nations, some facets ofthe 
trusteeship system, and the decline of Britain. He also provides glimpses into Truman's 
psyche and world-view as they relate to the issue of colonialism. McCullough portrays 
Truman as an intelligent, though not brilliant man, and one far more complex than is 
recognized by the pUblic.9 He made a key point when he noted that Truman was more a 
man of the nineteenth rather than the twentieth century and an individual who idolized 
the concept of Jeffersonian Democracy. 10 However, contrary to Jefferson, who rejected 
the idea of entangling foreign alliances, Truman embraced the idea of the United Nations, 
at least in the beginning. II Alonzo Hamby, Ohio State Professor of History wrote a 
biography that, like McCullough has, claimed that nineteenth-century ideology was the 
foundation for Truman's decision-making process. He repeatedly contends that, 
reputation notwithstanding, Truman was not rash in his decision-making and fully 
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analyzed the input from his advisors. 12 Hamby's Truman was a man who believed that 
"one could achieve idealistic ends by realistic means.,,13 In addition, Hamby noted that 
Truman tended to deal with problems in the foreign policy arena as soon as they came up 
which, in turn, had implications for his administration's overall foreign policy.14 
Emeritus Professor of History at Indiana University, Robert Ferrell's biography is 
different from the others in that it depicts a Truman who seems less involved in foreign 
affairs that delve into the issue of colonialism. Moreover, Ferrell does not examine 
foreign policy decisions as deeply as the other two biographers do in their books. 
Nevertheless, Ferrell's insights do not differ significantly from Hamby's and 
McCullough's instead reinforcing the point that Truman's foreign policy focus was on 
other issues, such as Europe's overall well-being and the power imbalances found in 
other regions of the world. While scant solid evidence exists in the biographies about 
Truman's actual opinions about colonialism, policy decisions made by his administration, 
as well as the insights provided his biographers, offer sufficient information to infer that 
Truman was ideologically opposed to the idea of imperialism. 
A survey of history books covering the period also provides more insight into the 
Truman administration's foreign policies and decision-processes relating to the colonial 
issue. The vast majority of these books tend to focus on the Cold War aspect of foreign 
affairs to the almost total exclusion of other foreign affair issues. In fact, the majority of 
history books reviewed here seemed to avoid the subject of colonialism. The ones that 
did mention colonialism did so only in passing and then only when talking about the 
tinancial problems being experienced in Western Europe at the time. Nevertheless, the 
examined history books covered a range of topics such as the Cold War, American 
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foreign policy, the Truman administration, Great Britain's postwar history and Vietnam, 
which provided some useful infonnation relating to the subject of colonialism. 
The Cold War history books tended to touch on the issue of colonialism by how it 
affected individual crises rather than in a systemic way. An exception was Yale 
Professor John L. Gaddis' 2005 book, The Cold War: A New History,IS where the author 
spends a few pages discussing the demise of colonialism after the Second World War. 
Gaddis makes some interesting points, beginning with the previously propounded idea 
that the First and Second World War's were the root cause ofthe end of colonialism16 
and that the consequences of these wars were realized twenty or thirty years later. 17 
Additionally, he claimed that Americans, including the State Department, opposed the 
concept of colonialism since this antiquated system reflected badly not only on the 
Europeans but on the United States as well. 18 However, Gaddis' comments have to do 
with the people of the United States and the Truman administration in general rather than 
specifically with Truman, the individual. Another well-known Cold War historian and 
prominent Emeritus Professor from Cornell University, Walter LaFeber, discusses the 
topic of colonialism in the same general tenns as Gaddis though he does not provide as 
convenient and encapsulated look at colonialism in the post-World War Two era. On the 
other hand, LaFeber's narrative goes into greater depth while focusing more on the 
economic aspects of colonialism. One of the most important aspects that LaFeber 
touched upon was that Americans disliked the closed markets that resulted from the 
protectionist trade methods intrinsic to the European colonial system. Another key point 
that LaFeber made was that the dislike of Americans' focused on the largest, best-known 
grouping of colonies that was the British Empire. 19 However, LaFeber does not identify 
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any particular person in the Truman administration as leading the fight against British 
colonialism. He does describe Truman and his advisors as attempting to deal with the 
instability of colonies, and former colonies, and contends that this instability had a ripple 
effect on a weakened Europe.2o Both books provide insight into the topic without 
providing a complete picture on the issue of colonialism. 
There are numerous books discussing the field of diplomacy and United States foreign 
policy that touch upon the subject of colonialism. Two of the major works reviewed here 
that focus on the United States' perspective of diplomacy are LaFeber's The American 
Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad 1750 to the Presenr i and Ferrell's 
American Diplomacy: A History.22 Ferrell's book provides a brief account ofFDR and 
Truman's lack of efforts in Indochina. He argues that they failed to stop the French 
government from attempting to re-exert control, particularly in the country of Vietnam 
during and after the war, and that this inaction sums up the issue of colonialism. Ferrell 
further says that France's attempt countered the trend of other postwar imperialist 
European nations who were starting to shed their colonies?3 LaFeber's foreign policy 
analysis provides a much broader picture of the United States' response to colonialism. 
As in LaFeber's previously reviewed Cold War book, economics again plays a big role in 
understanding the American standpoint and he covered Britain's Imperial Preference 
System of the 1930's which barred the United States from a number of profitable markets 
around the world?4 LaFeber does mention FOR's efforts to break up European 
imperialism including the Bretton Woods Accords that attempted to open British 
markets. 25 He also comments about the friction during the war between FOR and both 
Winston Churchill and Charles de Gualle over the issue of colonialism.26 LaFeber's 
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discussion of Truman and colonialism centered on the problems experienced in Indochina 
and, though he was quite clear about where FDR stood on the issue, he is vague on 
Truman's stance. In the case of the Netherlands and Indonesia LaFeber indicated that the 
United States forced the Dutch government to yield to Indonesian interests. Conversely, 
he implied that the Truman administration supported French efforts in Vietnam.27 Once 
again, the authors cited here provide some understanding of events which influenced 
decisions regarding the United States' foreign policy without providing either Truman's 
or his administration's overall position on the subject of colonialism. 
Charles Robertson's 1975 book, International Politics Since World War II; A Short 
History,28 looks beyond American centric foreign policies and into the international realm 
of diplomacy. Nevertheless, Robertson makes points similar to those touched upon by 
LaFeber and Ferrell though he also includes more about colonialism as it relates to the 
Truman administration. Robertson, Emeritus Professor of Government Smith College, 
links discussion of colonialism together with events during the Second World War and to 
activities of the European powers in the immediate postwar period. The basis of this 
connection was the decision by FOR's administration to give the British total control 
over the Southeast Asian theater of operations during the Second World War.29 This 
decision allowed European imperialists to more easily return to their old colonies as the 
Japanese withdrew. Robertson does cover efforts, not touched on by the earlier reviewed 
books, of both the Roosevelt and Truman administrations' to end colonialism by using 
the United States' influence in the United Nations to help fornmlate the trusteeship 
program. He also covers the familiar Cold War themes of declining European power, 
destabilization of the underdeveloped countries and the growth of a bi-polar world 
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centered on the United StateslUSSR conflict.30 Robertson contends that Truman was 
aware that the European colonial system was waning and believed that the United States 
needed to help smooth the changeover from colony to nation in the underdeveloped 
regions of the world. He makes that point during his discussion about Truman's Point 
Four Program, a program intended to help underdeveloped countries transition from their 
former colonial statuS.3l While Robertson's book does consider the impact of 
colonialism on the period, more than the other volumes discussed, his primary focus 
remains upon the growing conflict between the United States and the USSR. 
Other foreign policy books have examined the subject of colonialism and America's 
response in a much more roundabout manner. Nonetheless, they can still provide some 
insight into the issue and help to clarify fundamental points. The first book considered is 
an example where little mention is specifically made of colonialism yet it is still able to 
provide useful information. John Spanier's American Foreign Policy Since World War 
II 32 mentions economic factors in a manner similar to LaF eber' s critical appraisal of the 
Cold War. The University of Florida History Professor Spanier talks about the 
importance of the Open Door trading model to American foreign policy and the 
traditional opposition of the European powers to that principle.33 He also touches on the 
impact of the severe weather that occurred during the winter of 1947, which brought the 
economic problems of Britain to ahead. 34 Brutal winter conditions immobilized the 
country and produced a debilitating effect upon a British economy already suffering from 
the decline of the British Empire. This natural catastrophe had the additional effect of 
focusing the attention of the United States upon the plight of British and Western 
European empires. Another crisis related to the Truman administration discussed in the 
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book, was Vietnam. Spanier noted that though Truman was unenthusiastic about the 
situation and troubled by the French actions in the region he nevertheless overcame his 
qualms and backed France's attempt to reassert influence over their former colonies.35 
This American foreign policy book, with its limited references to colonialism, is typical 
for the majority of the books reviewed and illustrates how the reader is obliged to read 
between the lines to glean information on the subject. 
An interesting exception is a book contemporary to the period. In 1956, the 
Brookings Institution published United States Foreign Policy 1945-195536 by Professor 
of Political Science William Reitzel that provides further information about colonialism 
and the Truman administration. This book contains some Truman quotes from a 1946 
State Department Bulletin that are anti-colonial. To summarize Truman's statement; he 
warns Great Britain and other nations with interests in the Far East that the United States 
supports the sovereign rights of native peoples around the world, further that no changes 
should occur without the express agreement of the local people and finally, that those 
same people should be able to ultimately choose their own government.37 Reitzel also 
makes other interesting points about the issue of colonialism and its affect on foreign 
affairs of the period. He talks about the Soviet Union's support for the decolonization 
movement in the underdeveloped parts of the world and the motivation behind their 
stance. He argues that the Soviet motives are to weaken the Western Block by 
diminishing European empires and to further their own aims by appearing sympathetic 
and encouraging to the developing countries of the world.38 Reitzel examines the United 
States' policy on the issue of colonialism during the immediate postwar period. The 
United States policy adhered to the idea that self-determination was inevitable and that 
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everyone would gain from a methodical and orderly process. For this reason, the Truman 
administration believed that the United Nations should manage the transition process 
from colony to independent nation.39 The perceived threats to this approach were the 
Communists who would attempt to disrupt the changeover and foment chaos and anarchy 
for their own benefit. This viewpoint would endure in Cold War policy books during the 
ensuing decades until the end of the Cold War period.4o 
The next three books examined recount events and crises of the Truman 
administration with more insight into policy decisions relating, directly and indirectly, to 
the issue of colonialism. First considered is Washington correspondent and newspaper 
journalist Robert Donovan's work, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. 
Truman.41 The book's discussion of colonialism centers on the British and French 
Empires. These empires were already declining when Truman assumed the role of 
President and the United States was beginning to fill the inevitable vacuum they were 
leaving behind.42 In the beginning of his administration, Truman assumed the policies 
left to him by FDR without apparent deviation. In an interesting aside, Donovan implies 
that FDR, not Truman, began the policy of support for the French return to Indochina. 
LaFeber originated the idea that FDR's anti-colonial stand weakened in the case of 
Vietnam and other historians then set out to explore his work. 43 Donovan maintains that 
Truman was so overwhelmed with urgent concerns when he became President that, 
almost by default, he assumed a policy of benign neglect toward colonialism when he 
took over in the White House.44 In Britain's case, the transition from British Empire to 
Commonwealth seemed to be progressing well under Prime Minster Clement Attlee and 
his Labour Party, as illustrated by the end of colonial rule in India. Truman approved of 
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this evolution and his appreciative attitude established a good working relationship 
between the two countries through the six years the Labour Party was in power.45 
Nevertheless, Donovan explained that Truman's benign neglect on the issue of 
colonialism undermined his Asian foreign policy and brought about the crises in China 
and Korea later in his administration. 
Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, at the time junior editors at Time and Newsweek 
magazines respectively, collaborated on The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They 
Made.46 Published about ten years after Donovan's book, their work paints a similar 
picture of the Truman administration while reflecting different motivations for their 
actions. For example, the authors point out that Truman was inclined to follow FDR's 
lead when it came to foreign affairs and had a long track record of backing Roosevelt's 
policy decisions while in Congress and again as Vice-President.47 They also point to key 
differences between the Presidents' foreign policy management styles, which aid in 
understanding Truman's policies on colonialism. FDR was directive about his foreign 
policy objectives and the means he wanted to use to reach them while Truman was more 
of a team player who sought concurrence when dealing with diplomacy issues.48 The 
contention that Truman was more comfortable functioning as part of a team does play 
into the overall theme of the book that is about a group of senior diplomats and advisors 
to Presidents. Additionally, the idea that Truman based decisions upon consensus 
building does help to clarify his record on colonialism, since the authors make the 
argument that Truman's advisors were Anglophiles. This pro-British image does 
introduce the suggestion that Truman was less anti-imperialist than his predecessor was 
in office. Another important point made in the book was that with Churchill out of power 
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the government was actively decolonizing the British Empire.49 In fact, the rapidity of 
British withdrawals caused concern within the Truman administration and forced the 
United States to compete with the USSR over filling the power vacuums created by the 
declining British Empire. 5o The ensuing struggle with Russia caused the United States to 
drop the dissolution of the British Empire as America's foreign policy centerpiece and 
establish new objectives. With regard to the issue of France and Vietnam the authors do 
not subscribe to LaFeber's belief that FDR changed the United States' policy direction 
rather, they contend the Truman administration's Cold War objectives caused the 
divergence in the Vietnam policy from the earlier administration's position.51 
The final book of this trio on Truman and his advisors was A Preponderance of 
Power52 by Professor of History from the University of Virginia, Melvyn Leffler. Of 
these three histories, Leffler's book provides the most examples of the Truman 
administration's efforts to intervene in the issue of colonialism in the postwar period. He 
talks about the trend in United States foreign affairs to slow the process and reduce the 
upheaval caused by nationalist movements in undeveloped nations around the world. 53 
While other books touch upon the perceived phobia about Communist-sponsored 
underdeveloped countries' nationalism within the State Department Leffler also balances 
this phobia with other influences on Truman's foreign policy. Foremost was Truman the 
man. Truman's knowledge in relation to the field of foreign affairs was imperfect54 and 
resulted in some major blunders regarding the issue of colonialism. Two significant 
miscalculations occurred early in his administration when he underestimated the overall 
instability and weakness of Great Britain and Europe and then did not realize that the 
nationalist movements in the underdeveloped regions of the world were exploding out of 
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control. 55 Both of these missteps showed a lack of knowledge and experience and 
resulted in unintended consequences. Another example concerned the issue of overseas 
bases and the proposed United Nations (UN) trusteeship for islands in the Pacific. The 
retention of these holdings by the United States for military purposes served to undercut 
the trusteeship concept and undermined the whole process of decolonization. Both of 
these examples demonstrate the challenge of recognizing colonial-related issues, not 
identified as such, and serve to illustrate once again why a researcher needs to assess 
carefully all available information to understand Truman's position on colonialism. 
Leffler does mention that in Truman's first term the administration did attempt to support 
a policy of decolonization, to some extent, by calling on the major imperial European 
governments to reach some type of an accommodation with the various nationalist 
movements. 56 The Truman administration also used their policy regarding granting 
autonomy to the Philippines as an example of how to approach decolonization.57 All the 
same, Leffler called these attempts by the United States State Department to influence 
European decolonization ineffective and halfhearted at best. 58 In addition, he also agreed 
with LaFeber that FDR, despite his previously anti-colonial stance, was supportive of 
efforts to return French colonial rule to Indochina before the end of the war. 59 Leffler 
concurs with the idea, which remains constant throughout all accounts of Truman's 
foreign policy, that the Cold War overrode all other concerns in the area of foreign 
affairs.6o He also observed that obtaining millions of dollars through the Marshall Plan 
enabled the European empires to shore up their colonies.61 Therefore, Leffler argues that 
Truman's foreign policy decisions, such as implementing the Marshall Plan, were pro-
colonial in nature. 
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These three books about the Truman administration do provide insights into the 
United States government's response to colonialism in the postwar period and their 
accounts are more detailed than the other groups of literature reviewed. They portray 
Truman as wanting to follow the plans of FOR. They raise questions about the policies 
founded by the prior administration. Then, they consider the impact these previous 
decisions had upon Truman's perspective on the subject. Unlike the dearth of 
information regarding Truman vis-a.-vis colonialism there have been several accounts 
published about Franklin Roosevelt's Presidency that offer arguments about whether or 
not FOR was against colonialism in both word and deed. 
The generally accepted idea among the reviewed authors is that FOR was against the 
idea of empires ruling over a closed economic system of colonies.62 These books and 
articles support the view that FOR's rhetoric was anti-colonial. The first book in a series 
of Roosevelt histories reviewed is the 1989 edition of Major Problems in American 
Foreign Policy Volume II: Since 191463 which includes an essay taken from a book titled 
The United States at War, 1941-1945 by Bowling Green University Professor Gary 
Hess.64 Hess reiterates Roosevelt's known postwar objectives, including one that called 
for "the gradual demise of colonial empires leading eventually to independent states in 
Asia and Africa.,,65 In the same essay, Hess considers the practical aspects of FOR's 
policy as well as the 1945 Yalta accords that establish the idea of the United Nation's 
Trusteeship System. The trusteeship agreement wording is sufficiently general that 
former and current colonies might, or might not, be included. Then in addition, 
Roosevelt, and other participants of the Yalta Conference, decided to put off the selection 
of actual territories to be in the trusteeship program until a later date.66 The vague 
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wording of the agreement and delay in identifying specific territories for inclusion was a 
deliberate choice made by Roosevelt in order to protect the allies' fragile coalition.67 
Still, Hess argues that FDR was an unwavering champion of decolonization and that he 
focused his efforts on French colonies in Indochina to set an example for other colonial 
powers, particularly the British Empire.68 A 2003 book titled Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
the Formation of the Modem World,69 reinforced the view that FDR believed colonialism 
was not only a bad social and economic concept but that its continued existence would be 
the biggest threat to the expansion of democracy in the postwar world.7o The contributor 
of this chapter, and co-editor of the book Howard Thomas, Professor of History from 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, believes that the British were the 
focus ofFDR's anti-colonial stance, which coincides with what Hess suggested in his 
essay.7! Howard also agrees that Roosevelt did not waver in his opposition to 
colonialism. In fact, Howard thought that FDR's position was undermined after his death 
when, at the first meeting of the United Nation's Trusteeship Council, the United States 
delegation yielded to European pressure and changed the wording of the council's 
purpose from helping territories achieve independence to the more benign term of 
attaining self-government. His analysis places the blame for the weakening of the 
trusteeship program, and thus its ability to help end European imperial rule, squarely 
upon the Truman administration. Other authors also share this view. In a 1972 article, 
Hess claims that Truman killed the trusteeship concept by his support for the French 
intentions in Indochina. Moreover, Hess blames FDR for not doing enough to protect the 
trusteeship idea and guarantee his anti-colonialism legacy. 72 
Reverend Wilson Miscamble, Professor of History at Notre Dame University, 
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considers the question ofFDR's colonial foreign policy in his 2007 book, From 
Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War.73 He makes the point that 
Roosevelt was opposed to colonialism and viewed it as a bigger threat than 
communism.74 He also incorporates the conventional view that FDR kept his own 
council when it came to issues of State. 75 Miscamble alleges that the explanation given 
to the analysis ofFDR's foreign policy hinges upon the historian's viewpoint, in that 
Roosevelt was either a realist or a naIve operator in the realm of foreign affairs. 
According to the author, these conflicting interpretations ofFDR's policies rest upon 
judgments by analysts about whether or not a decision by FDR had the desired effect. In 
some respects, Miscamble does deviate from other interpretations ofFDR's efforts 
towards decolonization. He claims that FDR's objective to promote independence for 
former colonies always took a back seat to the necessity of protecting the wartime 
alliance and ensuring that the United States remained the dominant partner well into the 
postwar period. Miscamble contends that the truth of the situation was that Roosevelt's 
administration took no practical steps, beyond the President's persuasive rhetoric, to 
establish a true anti-colonial policy. 76 Additionally, FDR did not share the particulars of 
his policies with anyone; hence, the means used to achieve his goals were open to 
interpretation upon his death.77 This understanding ofFDR's legacy differs from the 
other books reviewed which take a stand, one way or the other, on FDR's anti-colonial 
efforts. For example, a 1982 book by John Gaddis explains FDR's brilliant use of the 
term linkage to describe the combine use of the powers of State to breakup the British 
Empire during the war. 78 Conversely, a 1975 article by LaFeber places the blame upon 
FDR for reversing his position on the trusteeship program during the later part of the war 
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and well before Truman took over in the White House.79 Lastly, Miscamble embraces 
another theme consistent with other Roosevelt histories. While FDR disliked all the 
colonial powers in Europe, he focused his efforts on Churchill and the British Empire.8o 
The British centric histories of decolonization in the postwar period point out that they 
did more than any other European power to bring about the end of colonialism.81 Only 
two of the researched books about the British Empire discussed the Roosevelt and 
Truman administrations to any degree. The first book, British Decolonization. 1946-
1997: When, Why and How did the British Empire Fall?82 by New Zealand's University 
of Canterbury History Professor David McIntyre, cites the pressure of the United States 
on the British government during the Second World War as a major factor in hastening 
the end of the British Empire. He adds that the inception of the Cold War in the late 
1940s reduced the impetus for the United States to end colonial rule.83 This position is at 
odds with British reporter Brian Lapping's book End of Empire84 where the author 
examined United States policies on a case-by-case basis to assess the overall effect it had 
upon Britain's decolonization efforts after the war. Specifically, Lapping cites Palestine 
and Egypt as case studies of the United States' efforts to end colonialism in the postwar 
period.85 In the case of Egypt, Lapping also goes on to cite other motives for the United 
States efforts to end Britain's colonial power in the oil rich region. He also argues that in 
the case of Palestine, Truman was looking more at Jewish voters in the United States than 
events in the Middle East when he recognized the State of Israel. 86 These two British-
centric books agree about the Roosevelt administration's decolonization policy but reveal 
a mixed interpretation of United States policies under Truman. 
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An additional review of the joint United States / United Kingdom (UK) postwar 
foreign policy history provides a more inclusive picture of both the FOR and Truman 
administration's efforts toward British decolonization while simultaneously reinforcing 
points made in other books examined in this section. The book, The United States. Great 
Britain, and the Cold War: 1944-194787 by Texas A&M University History Professor 
Terry Anderson, makes Roosevelt's hatred of the British Empire sound even more 
vicious than other accounts.88 Contrary to other versions, Anderson states that the early 
Truman administration renewed demands on the British to end imperialism. Moreover. 
the author contends that the new President personally disliked the British colonial system, 
and was suspicious of Churchill's efforts to enlarge the British Empire after the war.89 
Anderson also makes the point that Truman made an effort at the beginning of his time in 
office to continue FOR's foreign policies.9o Additionally, he claims that the desire to 
expand United States businesses into new markets, such as those found in the 
economically sheltered colonies of the British Empire, reinforced Truman's 
decolonization position.91 Anderson notes that Truman's position later evolves because 
of the Cold War and refocuses on opposing communism rather than colonialism.92 He 
also argues that another factor to consider when discussing the British process of 
decolonization was the assumption of power by the Labour Party whose stated goal was 
to transform the British Empire into a Commonwealth.93 Anderson's depiction of 
Truman as a new President shows an individual who shared Roosevelt's dislike and 
distrust for the British's colonial regime. In the same vein, Ohio State Professor of 
History Peter Hahn observed in his book The United States. Great Britain, and Egypt. 
1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War94 that the Cold War did divert 
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the United States from decolonization efforts and focused attention upon the Soviets. 
Nevertheless, Truman's administration still sought to diminish British domination over 
their colonies, especially in the Middle East.95 However, the British Empire was not the 
only European power to come under the United States scrutiny. An examination of the 
literature concerning the French colonial system provides another viewpoint about the 
history of Truman and his administration. 
The final collection of literature reviewed for information about Truman's position on 
the issue of colonialism concerns the Vietnam histories. As with the other groups 
reviewed here, the histories on Vietnam reinforce the idea that Roosevelt was opposed to 
colonialism and against French efforts to return to Indochina. However, an entry found 
in the 2003 Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War by Purdue University 
History Professor Patrick J. Hearden 96 does indicate that shortly before his death FDR 
was softening his position and not pushing for trusteeship of the former Indochina 
colonies.97 The fact that Roosevelt was beginning to back off in this area is reinforced by 
the most notorious, ifnot the most definitive, history of the Vietnam conflict commonly 
called the Pentagon Papers, which indicate a moderation ofFDR's position by 1945.98 If 
Roosevelt had indeed shifted his position this action could indicate whether Truman's 
subsequent policy decisions were in fact a continuation of the former President's policies 
or a sign of Truman's true feelings. At the very least, questions about the softening of 
FDR's anti-colonial stance and uncertainty about policies of one administration 
transferring intact to the next indicate a more complex interpretation of events than 
indicated elsewhere. Regardless of the underlying reasons, most histories agree that 
France's attempt to restore their colonial control over Indochina in the postwar period 
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drew the United States into the Vietnam War. In fact, many historians cite Truman's 
1950 decision to provide aid to France for operations in Vietnam as the beginning of the 
United States' involvement.99 Other books, such as University of Massachusetts 
Professor of History Loren Baritz's Backfire, 100 consider aspects of the Truman 
administration's Cold War mentality, such as the Truman Doctrine and National Security 
Council Study (NSC-68), as even more evidence to link Truman to America's 
involvement in Vietnam. 101 That aside, the fact that Truman provided financial support 
to French operations in Indochina provides the most substantial evidence so far that 
Truman might endorse colonialism. 
At length, one can see that by reviewing the period's literature, drawing upon 
associated subjects and considering persons of interest a researcher can identify some 
themes that influenced Truman and his administration's position on the issue of 
colonialism. For example, extensive analysis of Roosevelt's position concerning 
colonialism is available and various conclusions are discernible. First, no doubt exists 
that FDR opposed colonialism in any form though there are some questions about the 
state in which FDR left the decolonization policy upon his death. Depending upon the 
author one can find arguments that Roosevelt had: 1) a robust decolonization program; 2) 
an ineffectual program based solely on rhetoric; or 3) a policy that was in actuality 
diverging from its originally anti-colonial position. In the same vein, again depending 
upon the author, one can find a depiction of Truman as either steadfastly supporting 
FDR's legacy or changing foreign policies to a Cold War-centric view of the world with 
little room for anti-colonialist sentiment. 
The examined literature includes both academic works like the volumes by LaFeber, 
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Gaddis and Hahn as well as books aimed at a broader general audience such as 
McCullough and Lapping's. The academic works included many entries by historians 
but also contained publications by political science scholars that helped to augment the 
inquiry by providing access to diverse methodologies and points of view. Nevertheless, 
across this varied spectrum no significant differences were discernable between authors 
from the various specialties when they discussed similar material. Real differentiation 
was noted when the analysis was divided into subject areas which encompassed Truman, 
his administration and the state of colonialism in the postwar period. For example, Cold 
War history books place little importance upon the subject of European colonialism and 
dedicate little analysis to the issue and even less to Truman's role. The primary 
exception is that most of the books and articles do discuss Truman's role in helping 
French efforts to reestablish colonial rule over Indochina. Other than that, when the 
subject of American anti-colonialism comes up in Cold War literature the issue of 
colonial markets closed to external competition is also raised. LaFeber provides the best 
description of opening colonial markets when he writes about the United States' 
perpetual quest for new markets under the guise of the "Open Door" policy. 102 
Another theme garnered from the literature was that the United Nations' trusteeship 
program was at the center ofthe United States' decolonization efforts. Both the 
Roosevelt and Truman administrations wanted the United Nations to take on the role of 
supervising the demise of the European empires and developing the emerging nations in 
the postwar period. Complementing this approach was the belief by Truman, among 
others, that decolonization should be a deliberate and orderly process. However, the 
ultimate impact the trusteeship program had and the support it received from the United 
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States is open to debate. Moreover, while the United States expected the United Nations 
to establish systemic means to help develop new nations there was still concern that the 
USSR would seize control of nationalist movements in the underdeveloped regions of the 
world. Thus, the fear of Communist expansion links to the issue of decolonization as 
expressed in the Truman administration's Cold War rhetoric. 
The effect Truman's other foreign policy programs, the Marshal Plan and the Point 
Four Program, had upon the issue of European colonial rule is uncertain. Some accounts 
point to the Marshal Plan's funding of European powers as bolstering their efforts to 
shore up control in their colonies but these reports are vague about the true intent of the 
Truman administration. There does not seem to be a consensus about whether these 
programs intended to help the Europeans recover from the debilitations caused by the 
Second World War or instead were elements of a unified policy to shore up European 
control over their colonies. 
The British-centric history books mentioned that the United States applied pressure on 
Britain during both the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, to expedite the 
decolonization process in Palestine, Egypt and India. As a point of fact, Great Britain 
was not the only European country pushed by the United States to facilitate 
decolonization. The literature indicates that the Americans also prodded the Dutch 
government to settle with its colonies in Indonesia. However, most European countries 
wanted to retain control of their colonial holdings. England was the exception with its 
accelerated transformation from the British Empire to a Commonwealth under the 
postwar Labour Party. 
As asserted at the beginning of this historiography section, and confirmed by a review 
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of a number of books and articles, no established schools of thought exist which address 
Truman's position on the European empires of the postwar period. However, of the 
books written that focus on the Cold War and the administration, Gaddis' Cold War book 
provides the most persuasive support for the idea that the Truman administration was 
against the concept of colonialism. Furthermore, LaFeber's in-depth analysis, reinforced 
by the other writings noted here, endorse the concept that Americans have an inherent 
dislike of the closed markets that grow from colonial systems. This analysis adds force to 
Gaddis' notion about the Truman administration's anti-colonial stance. Therefore, based 
upon the sources examined, a reasonable interpretation is that there was an anti-colonial 
attitude in the Truman administration. When discussing Truman's private convictions the 
biographies naturally provide the best insight into Truman's personal response to 
colonialism. McCullough's biography is the most readable and provides an engaging 
picture of the President from Missouri. Hamby's Truman is similar to McCullough's but 
he backs up his analysis with more in-depth research. They both depicted President 
Truman as an intelligent man who, while not brilliant, grew into the job. Additionally, 
they portray Truman as practicing consensus building and point up the fact that he was 
active in the arena of foreign affairs relating to colonialism. Ferrell's research is well-
documented but does not focus on foreign policy subjects relating to colonialism, such as 
international trade, and therefore is less useful concerning the topic of this paper. None 
of the biographies captures Truman's dislike for colonialism in unmistakable terms that 
provide firm conclusions. As for Roosevelt's legacy on European colonialism and 
Indochina, the detailed research and facts in the books by Robertson and Donovan best 
capture his deep dislike for colonialism while he was still compromising with the 
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European powers over the colonies postwar future. However, none of the books 
satisfactorily addresses the conjecture over the meaning and impact ofFDR's decisions to 
allow France's return to Indochina. 
Even with the themes found in the material examined, no widespread consensus is 
apparent about the Truman administration's position on European colonial rule. As a 
result, further analysis is required to decipher the information and determine what 
Truman's personal and policy positions were concerning imperialism. The remainder of 
this paper will attempt to draw upon the material reviewed and the data collected to 
provide an answer to the question of whether Truman supported or opposed colonialism 
and whether his enacted foreign policies supported his personal position. 
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CHAPTER III 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT I WORLD WAR TWO 
As discussed in the historiographic section of the paper, FDR appears to be anti-
colonial and anti-imperialist. Roosevelt's anti-colonial tendencies become more 
apparent when talking about FDR and the British Empire. This section will build upon 
the information already presented about Truman's predecessor and examine FDR's 
legacy on the subject. Also reviewed will be the state of the existing policies about 
European colonialism that Roosevelt's administration left for Truman and his team to 
deal with in the waning days of the war and beyond. The assessment ofFDR's legacy 
win help to clarify the circumstances, both within the government and in the world at 
large, which framed Truman's understanding of the world beyond the United States 
borders and his administration's foreign policy concerning European colonization. 
First, FDR's position on the evils of colonialism did not develop in a vacuum but 
rather was the prevailing view among the American population before the Second World 
War. However, during that conflict a wartime rapport developed between the United 
States and the United Kingdom. Winston Churchill. in his famous 1946 Iron Curtain 
Speech at Westminster College in Fulton Missouri, even gave a name to this close 
association as the "Special Relationship".l Churchill's speech, given in Truman's home 
state a year after Roosevelt's death, indicated that this rapport remained strong even as 
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the Cold War was heating up. The unique nature of this bond was no doubt due in large 
part to the common history, language, and traditions shared by the two nations. The 
affinity alluded to by Churchill in his 1946 speech had contributed to the unprecedented 
associations undertaken by the two nations' leaders and militaries which combined their 
staffs in order to plan and conduct operations during the Second World War? Just a few 
of these joint organizations included, "the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Combined Food 
Board, Combined Production and Resources Board, Combined Raw Materials Board ... 
and later the Manhattan Project.,,3 
In spite of the close relationship, some frictions existed between the two nations. For 
instance, historically Americans have disliked anything English, a mindset that goes back 
to the colonial period of North America. The American Civil War when the British 
entertained the idea of establishing formal diplomatic relations with the Confederacy 
reinforced this attitude. The English also profited from doing business with the rebels, 
which upset the Northern population. The most notorious example of this profiteering 
was when the British built three heavily armed commerce raiders, the Florida, 
Shenandoah and Alabama, for the Confederates. The Confederate navy then used these 
vessels to conduct wartime operations that included attacking Northern-whaling ships.4 
The Union wartime press angrily described the Confederate-commanded raiders as "Built 
of English oak, in an English yard, armed with English guns, manned by an English crew 
.... ,,5 In the early Twentieth Century, there had been some popular anger over England's 
failure to payoff World War One debts, and in the 1920s and 1930s politicians were 
currying favor with the American Irish by running anti-British campaigns.6 FDR 
understood this historic animosity and tried to explain to Churchill how Americans could 
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work with the British while still harboring ill feelings towards them. Roosevelt said, 
"I've been trying to tell him ... It's in the American tradition, this distrust, this dislike 
and even hatred of Britain-the Revolution, you know, and 1812; and India and the Boer 
War, and all that.,,7 
Despite this historic enmity, a major part of America's Anglophobia later focused 
upon various aspects of British colonial rule that many Americans considered archaic, 
and not befitting modem times. In reality, American anti-imperialism to a large degree 
caused the British central government to alter some colonial policies during the war, such 
as promising their prize colony of India independence. The British realized that, to some 
extent, future British colonial polices needed the backing of American financial capital. 8 
Popular American publications in Great Britain at the time, like Life magazine with its 
1942 article titled, "An Open Letter from the Editors of LIFE to the People of England,,,9 
further impressed the anti-colonial feelings of the American population upon the British 
people. The Life article enlightens the British people about the American viewpoint on 
the British Empire in general and the colony ofIndia in particular: 10 
... one thing we are sure we are not [emphasis from original] fighting for is to 
hold the British Empire together. We don't like to put the matter so bluntly, but we 
don't want you to have any illusions. If your strategists are planning a war to hold 
the British Empire together they will sooner or later find themselves strategizing all 
alone ... , In the light of what you are doing in India, how do you expect us to talk 
about 'principles' and look our soldiers in the eye?ll 
The editorial pages of other well-known United States publications such as the New York 
Daily News and the Chicago Tribune also mirrored this attitude. 12 Near the end of the 
war Anglophobia, and its associated rhetoric, had grown to such an extent that it was 
affecting public opinion of the United States' closest wartime ally. 13 A national poll 
conducted during 1943 showed this anti-imperialist attitude toward the British by 
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disclosing that eighty percent of Americans supported rapid independence for the British 
colony of India while only twenty percent supported continued British rule. 14 Around 
this time, John Hickerson, the State Department's head of European Affairs, also sent a 
letter to Dean Acheson which summarized the popular opinion, "As you know, there is 
tendency in this country to blame the British in some way for everything that happens 
that we don't like.,,15 Furthennore, by the end of the war most of the higher-ranking 
representatives in American government felt as did Sumner Welles, a senior State 
Department official, "If the war is in fact a war for the liberation of peoples, it must 
assure the sovereign equality of peoples throughout the world. ... The age of 
imperialism is ended.,,16 A 1975 oral interview with Elbert G. Mathews, a retired State 
Department official who oversaw British affairs during the war, verified this belief about 
the empires: 
I have the distinct impression that during the latter part of the war, when 
colonial questions arose, most people in the Department took a Rooseveltian 
view: the less colonialism, the better. Yes, I think this is true. It's certainly true of 
those I was working with, my own attitudes. In other words, with respect to India, 
all of us thought, you know, independence, the sooner the better; they're going to 
have lots of problems, but the day of the British Raj is over. 17 
Most Americans were not openly hostile to the British, instead viewing them " ... as a 
misguided friend unfortunately wedded to a dangerous and outmoded behavior."ls FOR 
operated in this domestic environment throughout the Second World War and the Truman 
administration assumed the mantle of leadership against this backdrop. 
Another aspect of colonialism, which drew public and governmental interest in the 
United States, was the issue of trade. In the 1930s, the British government angered many 
in the United States when their answer to the Great Depression was the erection of even 
greater trade barriers. While colonial rulers have traditionally restricted some access to 
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colonial economies, the British, to the particular detriment of American businesses, 
intensified the restrictions on outside trade. The British established the Imperial 
Preference System that gave trade benefits to all members of the Commonwealth. This 
approach included more than just the traditional underdeveloped colonies in Asia, the 
Middle East and Africa. The new protectionist rules also included the British Empire's 
developed and sovereign countries such as South Africa, Canada, Australia and the 
United Kingdom. 19 John M. Leddy, a State Department official involved with trade 
issues at the time, described the general impression the United States gathered about the 
purpose of the British Imperial Preference System: 
In other words, it was a way for British industry to get a lock on particular 
foreign markets which happened to be politically related to it--the Empire and the 
Commonwealth. This affected the underdeveloped world as wen, and not just the 
United States. All non-British areas were discriminated against in the British 
market by the preference system. Because the preference is nothing more or less 
than a tariff discrimination. Therefore, we felt that if tariff barriers and trade 
barriers were to come down allover the world then preferences ought to be 
eliminated, as a part of that process. The ideal being that you should, generally 
speaking, between separate customs territories at any rate, or quasi-independent 
areas, apply the principles of the unconditional most-favored-nation clause, or 
nondiscrimination . . .. But the great bulk of opinion in the State Department and in 
the Government, and I must say I think, indeed, in the Congress as well was that the 
British preferential system was an imperial system. It was a colonialist system. It 
was one that had bred a great deal of friction between us and the British, and that it 
ought to be junked. So that was our position.2o 
Furthermore, others believed that the system created greater economic hardships for 
countries that had more limited natural resources, such as Germany and Japan, by 
denying them access to needed crops and raw materia1.21 The economic obstructionist 
aspect of the Imperial Preference System is important because it influenced the Great 
Depression, World War Two and the early postwar period. Another issue that affected 
the Roosevelt and Truman administrations was the developing nationalist movements 
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around the world. The movements had been building for some time but the depression of 
the 1930s seemed to speed up the process and riots were breaking out in various colonies 
around the world, such as the British West Indies.22 
During wartime, FDR had to balance maintaining the alliance while working toward 
his goals concerning the postwar world. John Sebrega notes that when Roosevelt was 
thinking, "about the postwar world, he did so frequently in terms of the problems of the 
prewar world. In other words, he wanted to remove permanently the conditions that had 
blighted international affairs during his lifetime.,,23 Roosevelt was a long time disciple of 
Wilsonian internationalism dating back to his time in Woodrow Wilson's administration 
as Assistant Secretary of the Navy.24 FDR even championed and defended Wilson's 
foreign policy beliefs during the heyday of isolationism in the 1930s.25 He also adhered 
to the Open Door policy saying he wanted to end "all those artificial restrictions and 
controls ... which had created such tragic havoc to world economy during the past 
generation.,,26 Given this background, it is understandable that Roosevelt's aim was to 
end the chance of future wars through international efforts like those at the Dumbarton 
Oaks conference and to establish the economic security freedom called for in the Bretton 
Woods Agreement, which would protect against another Great Depression.27 The 
postwar portion ofFDR's overall agenda also called for the United States to take on a 
greater role in world affairs, establish some kind of amenable relationship with Russia, 
and develop China into a friendly regional power.28 A portion of this agenda, relating 
back to his belief in fundamental liberties for all people articulated in his Four Freedom's 
Speech,29 aimed at ending conditions such as he saw during a 1942 trip to the British 
colony of Gambia, which he described as, "The most horrible thing I have ever seen in 
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my life.,,3o More to the point, colonial rule, with its restrictive trade practices and 
oppression, was likely to sow the seeds for more volatility and future world wars. 31 The 
lofty words of the 1941 Atlantic Charter called for territorial adjustments per the wishes 
of the native peoples, affirmed that people have the right to self-determination, and stated 
that there should be an end to trade barriers.32 There are also the words that FDR used 
during a 1941 speech to a gathering of the press, '"There has never been, there isn't now, 
and there never will be, any race of people on earth fit to serve as masters over their 
fellow men .... We believe that any nationality, no matter how small, has the inherent 
right to its own nationhood.,,33 Pursuit ofintemational social reform provoked the 
cynical British allies who believed that personal hatred and jealousy tainted Roosevelt's 
attacks on the British Empire. For instance, the British Foreign Secretary once 
questioned FDR's sincerity when Roosevelt called for the independence of Hong Kong, 
saying that the President had never offered freedom to any of America's regions like 
Hawaii.34 Still, FDR's primary goal was to maintain the coalition and sustain a 
reasonable level of trust with the other alliance leaders. The balance between preserving 
the alliance and urging the end of European empires would prove to be a harder challenge 
as the war went on.35 
The biggest obstacle to stabilizing the postwar order was Great Britain, with its huge 
colonial empire, and its staunch defender Churchill. Churchill, like others in Europe, 
understood only that their empires had enabled them to defend against the Germans and 
their allies in both World Wars. 36 Churchill's fear was that without the resources of the 
British Empire, if another war came the nation would be lost before the Americans could 
come to their aid. Churchill understood that various colonies would need increased 
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freedoms but believed that they should remain under the benevolent umbrella of the 
European powers lead by Her Majesty's Great Britain.37 Churchill's mental picture for 
the future envisioned the traditional balance of power in Europe as radiating out to the 
rest of the postwar world. Thus counterbalancing what he expected to be the greatest 
threat to world peace, Russia. 
Some in Whitehall listened to the American anti-colonialist rhetoric during the war 
while others, like Churchill, did not wish to heed the message.38 These words capture 
Churchill's absolute opposition to decolonization, "While there is life in my body no 
transfer of British sovereignty will be permissible. ,,39 While not winning every battle, the 
pro-empire Churchill was quite successful in fending off many ofFDR's attacks on the 
solidarity of the British Empire.4o When Roosevelt pressed in 1942 for Indian 
independence, Churchill feared instability in the region and fought back. He threatened 
to resign saying, "I have not become the King's First Minister to preside over the 
liquidation of the British Empire.,,41 
FDR's stratagem to deal with the threat to world stability caused by European colonial 
rule was to implement a variety of foreign policies that would force change. One of the 
earliest tactics was establishing the Lend-Lease Act that called for the British to begin 
eliminating the Imperial Preference System and open their markets to United States trade 
through shared use of navel and air bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda and the British 
West Indies. Private messages, published later, showed that tying the colonial trade issue 
into the Lend-Lease negotiations was a topic of singular friction between the two leaders. 
In that same correspondence, Churchill expressed his fear that the British nation would 
become a second tier actor on the world stage.42 Leo Amery, at the time the British 
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Secretary of State for India, summed up the quandary the British faced by relaxing the 
Imperial Preference System because of the American Lend-Lease deal: 
We. in our anxiety to secure Lease-Lend and bring America in (to the war), have 
never had the courage to say straight out that Imperial Preference is not merely a 
matter of economic policy but a natural political right of the British Commonwealth 
. ... Imperial Preference means so much to our own export trade and to many parts 
of the Empire and we may well find ourselves, all of us, after the war, even more 
dependent upon inter-Empire trade than at present.43 
In the end, the British had little choice but to give in and give the Americans what they 
wanted in exchange for needed support. 
Another example of Roosevelt's early efforts to force change upon the British Empire 
came in the Caribbean where the United States State Department promoted public unrest 
by opening up a direct dialogue with the locals that served to weaken British control in 
the area. The transfer of American naval destroyers to several British colonial Caribbean 
bases allowed more American influence and trade into those regions. The establishment 
of a United States-instigated joint regional commission, with a decidedly American slant, 
to collaborate on air security as well as other economic and social issues, followed the 
transfer of ships in the Caribbean. The United States later duplicated the regional 
commissions in other British-controlled areas.44 These anti-colonial actions in the 
Caribbean occurred prior to any other United StateslUnited Kingdom tensions over 
colonies and probably occurred because of the proximity of the region to America. 
A further case in point of Roosevelt's persistence in pursuing an anti-colonial policy 
appears in 1943 when he had the United States representative in India publicly advocate 
the idea of granting the colony Dominion-status similar to Canada.45 FDR had wanted to 
address this issue ever since 1941 when he had confronted Churchill about it privately. 
That 1941 argument had so angered Churchill that the Prime Minister later said that 
39 
Roosevelt "never raised it verbally again.,,46 Colonialism in general, and India in 
particular, was the one subject that neither FOR nor Churchill could talk about in civil 
terms in what was generally a congenial personal relationship.47 It is somewhat ironic 
that while Churchill opposed Germany's domination over the European continent, 
nevertheless he believed that protecting the British Empire was his personal mission, 
even if it interfered with his affinity for FOR.48 
The most critical feature of FOR's efforts to end colonial rule was the concept of 
trusteeship. Roosevelt saw the trusteeship program as a way to let allies manage the 
orderly transfer of power to colonies without the chaos that could ensue in the 
undeveloped parts of a postwar world.49 Initially, Churchill and the British were against 
the idea, suspecting that it was a ploy designed to remove British influence from various 
regions so that Americans could step in with their own informal colonial rule. 50 Being 
the largest of the European empires the British viewed themselves as the spokesperson 
for the entire institution and they believed that the concept of trusteeship was another 
manifestation of American jealousy that they needed to block. 51 
England's empire was not FOR's only concern since there were other European 
empires that drew his attention. For example, France, with its colonies in Indochina, 
forced Roosevelt into dealing with the universally disliked General Charles de Gaulle and 
caused the President to be mindful of France's colonial problems. 52 France was a 
difficult country for FOR to work with since, as Secretary of War Henry Stimson said, 
Roosevelt "hated de Gaulle so fiercely that he was almost incoherent on the subject.,,53 
Additionally, Roosevelt thought that France did not deserve treatment as a world power 
given their abysmal failure against the Germans.54 FOR also had a deep-seated feeling 
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that France, WIder de Gaulle's inept rule, would fall into anarchy and civil war in the 
postwar period. 55 Nevertheless, pressuring the British to release its hold on colonies 
during the course of the war had proven difficult, so concentrating on the French seemed 
to be an easier tactic since those colonies were already WIder Axis control. 56 Hence, 
though the British possessed the most colonies globally, FDR later focused on the French 
as practicing the worst form of colonial exploitation and leaving native populations in 
terrible circumstances.57 Roosevelt's ability to compartmentalize troubles does create 
some confusion about his true position though, a prime example of which was his 
handling of the Indochina situation near the end of the war. When faced in January 1945 
with the problem of how to handle the rapid Japanese departure from Indochina, instead 
of trying to set up a local government, amid other more pressing troubles, FDR told the 
Secretary of State, "I still do not want to get mixed up in any Indochina decision. It is a 
matter for post-war."S8 
Towards the end of the war, the British used joint commissions, modeled after the 
previously discussed Caribbean commission, to their advantage. By 1945, the British 
worked colonial development projects through the commissions that gave the impression 
that the United States was part of those ventures. Another piece of good news for the 
British was that by then the American anti-colonialist rhetoric seemed to have peaked.59 
Moreover, pressures within FDR's administration were growing to reduce the emphasis 
on the trusteeship program and anti-colonial viewpoint. Pentagon officials wanted to 
retain Pacific territories gained from the Japanese and Roosevelt's White House advisors, 
in conjWIction with important members of Congress, were urging a more tolerant 
interpretation of the trusteeship program.60 More significant from the British 
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government's point of view, were the positive diplomatic discussions between British and 
American officials at Dumbarton Oaks and later at the Yalta Conference where Roosevelt 
himself backed off on implementation of the trusteeship program.61 The scope of the 
plan was narrowed so that, while it could be applied to other territories, the program 
would only officially pertain to League of Nation mandates that were in enemy occupied 
lands62 and "any other territory that may voluntarily (emphasis from original) be placed 
under trusteeship.,,63 By agreeing to this wording, the entire concept changed, with the 
British becoming exempt from the trusteeship's effects, at least in the short term. With 
this modification to the trusteeship idea, Roosevelt also seemed to relax his position 
concerning Indochina in that he would not interfere with the return of the French and 
other European powers to the area.64 FDR reinforced this position by agreeing at the 
Quebec Conference to let the British retain control of the South-East Asia Theater of 
Operations thereby enabling the British to secure former colonial Burma and Malaya, the 
Dutch to return to the East Indies and the French to hope for renewed influence over their 
old colonies in Indochina.65 There are different interpretations for this lessening of 
American anti-colonialist foreign policy. One view is that FDR was reconsidering his 
position on European colonial rule and becoming less anti-imperialist in thought. 
The weakening of the trusteeship program at that point in time raises the question of 
whether, had he lived longer, Roosevelt might have reversed his policies on 
colonialism.66 The most likely answer to that query is that FOR, being a brilliant 
politician, was just adapting to the current situation as he had done numerous times in the 
past, and in all likelihood was not about to change his core beliefs. This explanation 
argues that the retreat on the trusteeship program was a tactical ploy. The fact that 
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Roosevelt did not make any obvious public changes to his attitude about colonialism 
during this period reinforces this point of view. Almost certainly, Roosevelt decided to 
pull back on this particular issue in the short term, to maintain good work relations with 
the other nations and with the intention of addressing it again in the future when 
circumstances permitted. FDR saw decolonization as a long-term process as shown when 
he said that independence for the French colonies in Indochina could take "perhaps 
twenty to thirty years. ,,67 One must also remember that Roosevelt had to balance his anti-
colonial objectives with his other essential goals: winning the war, maintaining the 
alliance and supporting his military leaders.68 On a strategic level, following the Yalta 
Conference, FDR told his cabinet at a meeting on 9 March 1945 that he was determined 
to pursue his original definition of trusteeship. Furthermore, about this same time he told 
Charles Taussig, a close friend, that full independence should be the ultimate aspiration 
for all colonial peoples.69 Therefore, it is apparent that Roosevelt's easing of the 
emphasis on which territories to include in the trusteeship program was not a FDR-
sanctioned mandate for President Truman to change the United States' established anti-
colonial foreign policy. Rather, it shows that the subject of European colonialism was a 
complicated, intricate issue that took place in the even more complex and multifaceted 
arena of foreign affairs. 
Truman's Presidential decisions on colonialism need consideration on their merits and 
not through the distorting lens of supposition about whether or not they should have 
maintained the previous administration's policies since it appears that those policies were 
in flux. 70 Even so, this focus on Truman does not mean that one should ignore FDR's 
extensive record on the subject. After all, Roosevelt's well-known attitude towards 
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colonialism and his foreign policy actions established the baseline for the new regime. 
FDR's administration championed the cause of colonial freedom and national self-
determination all through the Second World War even if the President was occasionally 
required to soften his efforts from time to time.71 Considering Roosevelt's anti-
colonialist heritage from the perspective of the situation that Truman found himself in on 
12 April 1945 does FDR a disservice. To appreciate Roosevelt's anti-imperialist legacy 
one should consider " ... the broad outlines of his foreign policy .... ,,72 such as his Four 
Freedoms speech and the Atlantic Charter. 73 
Although the nation and world were changing, some conjectures are possible 
concerning the domestic situation that Truman faced in 1945 based upon information 
from the prior discussion. The relations between the two English-speaking nations were 
warm though there were some public frustrations over Britain's colonial practices. While 
people in the United States felt that the entire European colonial system was an outdated 
and obsolete institution, the British bore the brunt of United States hostility toward the 
practice. The sheer size of the British Empire, the belief that Britain was still a major 
player in world affairs, the United States' own colonial history, and the draconian trade 
practices still in place from the 1930s, influenced Americans' animosity. As for the 
government, FDR's public rhetoric leaves little doubt about the administration's official 
position. Though Roosevelt maintained close ties with wartime England, he was 
unabashedly anti-imperialist. While decolonization was an issue near and dear to 
Roosevelt's heart nevertheless pursuit of those objectives, as demonstrated by the case of 
colonial trusteeships, remained secondary to the more immediate goals of winning the 
war and maintaining the alliance. Underlying FDR's attitude was the feeling that the end 
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of the European imperial system was inevitable and that the true question was how soon 
it would collapse.74 FDR believed that solving the colonial problem could wait until the 
United Nations was up and running. 75 
At the same time, the Europeans were in a state of flux. The bulk of the European 
empires ran from Southeast Asia to the Middle East and included nearly all of Africa. 
These empires, and the process of colonial rule, had extended from the Fifteenth Century 
until the time of the First and Second World Wars. Before the conflicts, the Europeans 
had appeared invincible. By the end of the Second World War, this illusion had been 
shattered.76 As the primary war raged on, the European powers either lost control of their 
colonies, such as when Japan seized Indochina and Indonesia, or became engrossed in the 
homeland's life and death struggle.77 These circumstances merged with the insight 
within the colonies that the imperial powers were not omnipotent and produced the sense 
that the burden of imperial rule could be overthrown. Nationalist movements had been 
sowing discord during the interwar years and their impact only strengthened by the end of 
the second global conflict. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Europeans' 
weakened condition provided these newly empowered natives an excellent opportunity to 
achieve independence. 78 During the war, even the intact British received extraordinary 
pressure from its most well-established and critical colonies, India and Egypt, to break 
from the British Empire.79 In the ever-troublesome Middle East, countries also sought 
independence and by the end of the war, a hundred thousand or more Jews were moving 
to Palestine, which inflamed the situation even more.so Thus, Truman faced a situation of 
European empires in flux when he assumed office as the war ended. 
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CHAPTER IV 
HARRY S. TRUMAN 
EARL Y PRESIDENTIAL PHILOSOPHY 
By the time Truman, "a fanner boy from Jackson County,,,l assumed the presidency 
he had been Vice-President for less than a hundred days. Truman had met FDR on a few 
brief occasions and did not know Roosevelt's plans and personal policies.2 Truman had 
no knowledge about major programs, such as development of the atom bomb, and did not 
have the "need-to-know" required to enter FDR's secret war center, the White House 
Map Room. 3 Truman told his daughter in private that Roosevelt, "never did talk to me 
confidentially about the war, or about foreign affairs or what he had in mind for peace 
after the war.,,4 Moreover, FDR failed to outline his overall foreign policies and 
objectives to his staff. After many years in office, Roosevelt had consolidated military 
and diplomatic decision-making into his own hands. Even primary advisors such as 
Joseph Davies, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and close friends like Harry 
Hopkins knew only bits and pieces of the overall design. No one knew FDR's grand 
strategy and so no one could advise Truman on what to do next.5 A Washington Post 
article at the time summed up the military and foreign policy situation facing Truman by 
saying, " ... President Truman comes into this gigantic assignment under a handicap.,,6 
Nevertheless, in the beginning Truman tried to act as his predecessor would have 
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wanted. Some people claim that he would point at FDR's image in the Oval Office and 
say, "I'm trying to do what he would like.,,7 Other close advisors routinely heard the new 
President ask himself "I wonder what Roosevelt would have done?" or "Would he think: 
this was the right thing?"g This desire to emulate FDR is not surprising since Truman 
had grown up believing in the idea of great men molding history. He recounted to others 
that his favorite book as a boy was about notable figures that shaped history, such as 
Moses, Caesar, and Genghis Khan. In a letter to a reporter, Truman explained his 
historical perspective as "real history consists of the life and actions of great men who 
occupied the stage at the time.,,9 FDR had been the President for twelve years, much 
longer than any other American President who had held office. He led the country during 
the Great Depression and steered the course through the Second World War. For most 
Americans Roosevelt embodied the essence of the United States government. Truman 
wanted to follow his example. Nonetheless, Truman knew that he was unprepared to take 
over making foreign policy decisions and the running of the United States. The contrast 
between Roosevelt and Truman is marked when one considers that Truman was a farm 
lad from Missouri while Professor Dallek describes FDR as ''the most cosmopolitan 
American to enter the White House since John Quincy Adams in 1825.,,)0 In May 1945 
Truman said, "I am the last man fitted to handle it and it happens to me.',ll All the same, 
by October 1945 Truman made a speech that cited foreign policy aims, which sounded 
both anti-colonial and Rooseveltian in its pronouncements, 
1. We seek no territorial expansion .... 2. We believe in the eventual return of 
sovereign rights and self-government to all peoples who have been deprived of 
them by force. 3. We shall approve no territorial changes ... unless they accord 
with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned. 4. We believe that all 
peoples who are prepared for self-government should be permitted to choose their 
own form of government. 12 
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Truman also believed, as had Roosevelt, that the United States should be more involved 
in the postwar world. 13 
FDR / HST DIFFERENT PERSONALITIES 
The differences between Truman and FDR are well known but a comparison may help 
understand Truman's style in dealing with the colonial question. First, FDR was a 
politician who saw the world in various shades of gray, a grand thinker who could make 
amazing intuitive leaps. 14 Conversely, Truman's background and training gave him a 
different temperament and worldview. 
Harry's schooling conspired with his moral and religious upbringing to leave 
him with the conviction that personal behavior, and by extension that of societies 
and nations, should be guided by universally understandable Victorian maxims, 
that distinctions between good and evil were unambiguous, that there were few 
gray areas in life. IS 
Compared to FDR, Truman was a mental plodder whose strength lay in his dogged study 
and perseverance at understanding the many faces of complex problems. Even Secretary 
of State Dean Acheson a real admirer of Truman, once said when comparing Presidents 
Lyndon B. Johnson and Truman that "They were cut from the same cloth. They both 
come from border states ... but Johnson has an A mind and Truman a B mind.,,16 
According to Miscamble, the thirty-third President had a" ... distaste for complexity and 
his preference for clear and fixed standards along with his hesitation to engage in creative 
or conceptual thinking made him susceptible to a very straightforward approach to policy 
making.,,17 Not prone to making hasty decisions Truman was a cautious thinker who 
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dealt with problems linearly rather than addressing them within an interlocking 
framework of policy considerations. The consequence of Truman's method of handling 
problems was that American foreign policy decisions appeared to be haphazard instead of 
employed in a consistent, systemic manner. In the final analysis, Truman's linear 
thinking makes it difficult for a researcher to perceive the President's overarching 
philosophy when considering ideas such as anti-colonialism and when examining a range 
of foreign policy decisions. 
In the end, the biggest difference between the two men was one of management style. 
FDR manipulated situations and often put off making choices until a solution presented 
itself or something forced a decision. On the other hand, Truman wrestled with a 
problem until he had come to a decision about it. This difference in style enhanced the 
image of FDR as a detached intellectual while Truman seemed blunt and plainspoken. 
Truman's aura of brusque individuality was deceptive though, since he sought the 
counsel of able advisors and experienced men, relying upon them to help bridge the gaps 
in his own knowledge about international affairs. 18 
Unlike FDR's well-known compulsion to centralize policy-making in his own hands, 
Truman was more than willing to share the process with his advisors and department 
heads, especially in the beginning of his administration. A good example of these 
differences in management techniques concerns the conference to discuss the formation 
of the United Nations held in San Francisco shortly after Truman assumed office. Prior 
to his death FDR had been planning to lead the American delegation. Truman decided to 
leave the responsibility for running the delegation to the group's leaders. He provided 
personal instructions but was willing to delegate duties to others whom he thought were 
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more proficient in the foreign affairs arena.19 This style of management makes it difficult 
at times to pin down Truman's true feelings concerning a range of foreign policy 
decisions that occurred on different dates. Throughout Truman's time in office, this 
result was true of administrative decisions that did not reach the top tier of foreign policy-
making and therefore did not require the President's personal pronouncement. For 
example, Truman had a deep dislike for the Spanish government of Francisco Franco and 
was hostile to the idea of congenial relations between the dictator and the United States. 
Nevertheless, when the Departments of State and Defense instituted normal relations and 
laid the groundwork for military bases in Spain he begrudgingly went along with the 
Departments' earlier decisions.2o 
While there are many differences between the personalities of Roosevelt and Truman, 
they shared some common traits. Both possessed an idealistic streak concerning the 
future of humanity. 2 1 In Truman's case, one might attribute this idealism in some 
measure to his background, temperament, or his Masonic training.22 An example came in 
one 1940 speech concerning civil rights where he used the "brotherhood of man" concept 
common to Masonic teachings.23 Not all Masons practice that philosophy; yet, Truman 
seemed to when he said, "I believe in the brotherhood of man, not merely the 
brotherhood of white men but brotherhood of all men before the Law.,,24 Regardless of 
the source of his worldview, Truman does seem to be in agreement with the traits 
ascribed to FDR when conversing on such things as idealistic support for the United 
Nations, trusteeship and anti-imperialism.25 
Another quality that Truman had in common with Roosevelt was the belief that the 
treatment of foreign affairs is the same as local and national politics?6 While Truman 
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tended toward a stark black and white view of the world, he was also a product of the 
corrupt Pendergast political machine that created a seasoned and pragmatic politician 
who understood and employed the fme art of political compromise.27 In Truman's world; 
the facts of life dictated that some give and take would be required regardless of whether 
one was dealing with Tom Pendergast, Joseph Stalin, or Winston Churchill. This view of 
politics allowed both Presidents to compromise on some objectives in order to achieve 
other, greater goals but it did result in some inconsistencies and ambiguities in their 
foreign policies. These uncertainties are what allow various interpretations as to their 
intent and outlook about colonialism. Therefore, one must not only look at individual 
decisions but also at the rhetoric and underlying source of their philosophy. 
WILSONIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
In addition to Roosevelt, Truman, like FDR before him, gained inspiration from 
President Woodrow Wilson. During World War One Truman saw service as a young 
artillery officer and held a life-long belief that he had fought for Wilson's Fourteen Points 
and its League ofNations.28 Truman once said, "How much misery and suffering the 
world would have been spared if we had only followed Woodrow Wilson!,,29 Truman 
supported Wilson's idea ofa League of Nations and labeled Congress' rejection of the 
concept and refusal to accept the nation's rightful role as a world power a fatal error. 
During the mid-l 930s, he deviated from Wilson's idea of internationalism for a short 
time when he supported popular legislation devised by isolationist Gerald Nye. Senator 
Nye's Committee had published a report, which asserted that arms dealers had unduly 
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influenced American foreign policy prior to the First World War and an outpouring of 
isolationist sentiment resulted. Truman later called his support ofNye and his isolationist 
legislation, designed to keep the United States out of the troubles brewing in Europe, a 
momentary error in judgment. Furthermore, Truman described Nye as " ... a demagogue 
senator from North Dakota.,,30 Truman went on to support FDR's interventionist policies 
as way of making up for past failings.3! He set forth his position in speeches that said, "I 
have said time and again that Almighty God intended this great Nation to be the leader of 
what is right and what is well for the world, and He indicated that in 1920 after the First 
World War. But there were certain men who felt that that was not the proper thing to do, 
and then we had to go through World War II.,,32 When there was talk of the United 
States withdrawing from the world scene after the Second World War Truman argued 
that Americans were too smart to embrace, once again, isolationism.33 This conviction 
dovetailed with FDR's rather nebulous vision of a world organization in which the 
United States, Britain, Russia and China would work to secure world peace while 
expanding free trade around the globe.34 Later, Truman would say in his memoirs, "I still 
believe in Woodrow Wilson's philosophy of self-determination.,,35 This attitude, linked 
with his desire to follow FDR's foreign policy, influenced Truman's outlook on the world 
order and the role of both the United States and the European empires. 
ANTI-IMPERIALISM 
A point that Truman made in speeches was that the United States' goal in World War 
Two was, " ... for peace and for the welfare of mankind. We are not fighting for 
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conquest. There is not one piece of territory or one thing of monetary nature that we 
want out of this war.,,36 As a display of Truman's beliefs one can point to the fact that 
the Philippines received independence from the United States on 4 July 1946 despite the 
opposition of some members of Congress and military leaders who felt that it was far too 
soon?7 Furthermore, his desire to promote freedom and democratic principles extended 
well beyond the shores of the United States. In one of Truman's final speeches he spoke 
ofthe inevitable demise of European empires and the end of their colonial rule with 
pride, "Just in the years I have been President, 12 free nations, with more than 600 
million people, have become independent: Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, Korea, 
Israel, Libya, India, Pakistan and Ceylon. ... These names alone are testimony to the 
sweep of great force which is changing the face of half of the world.,,38 Of the new 
postwar world that Truman imagined he said, "The old imperialism-exploitation for 
foreign profit-has no place in the concepts of democratic fair dealing.,,39 Truman helped 
the growth of freedom within the European empires through a variety of methods. 
Within these actions, one can find evidence of his dislike for colonialism and support for 
the right of self-rule. 
As previously discussed, Truman was not an isolationist as one would probably have 
assumed based on his background, rather he was pro-Open Door in his outlook. He 
described his feelings on the subject saying, "We are moving toward our goal of world 
peace in many ways. ... The most important efforts which we are now making are those 
which support world economic reconstruction .... To restore world trade we have 
recently taken the lead in bringing about the greatest reduction of world tariffs that the 
world has ever seen. ,,40 He was a long-time supporter of free markets and when the 
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Trade Agreement Act of 1934 passed the Congress, he called it a major legislative feat. 41 
Truman believed that the 1920s' restriction of trade, with its tariffs and other barriers, 
was a terrible thing for the world. He perceived the problem as being that leaders of 
government and commerce were acting to protect their own producers but, in turn, they 
excluded others who depended upon that trade to buy their products. As global trade 
slowed, rather than trying to stimulate it, nations instead practiced trade reprisals and 
even increased the restrictions such as Britain's Imperial Preference System.42 Truman 
put it this way, "They ignored the fact that the whole world suffers when each country 
tries to make itself a tight little island with high walls all around.'.43 In large measure the 
economic problems of the 1920s and 1930s, and the suffering that occurred during the 
Great Depression, drove his anti~imperialist sentiment quite apart from his philosophical 
reasoning. In 1944, Truman joined with other Senators to call for more internationalism 
and free trade. He and his fellow Senators cautioned that the harmony of the postwar 
world "depends on the abandonment of political nationalism and economic imperialism 
and autarchy.'M President Truman's address about America's foreign economic policy, 
given at Baylor University on 6 March 1947, summarized his belief that the restrictive 
trade practices of the 1930s led not only to the Great Depression but also to a de facto 
economic war waged with tariffs and trade restrictions prior to the start of the shooting 
war.45 In particular, he blamed Nazi Germany and the British Empire for being the main 
practitioners of the malicious form of economic warfare that destroyed the world's 
economy.46 He concluded the speech by presenting the idea that international free trade, 
orchestrated by a globally minded rather than an inward looking United States, was the 
true salvation for the future.47 He did more than just pay lip service to this view when he 
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and his administration fought the Republicans to protect the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In a speech after a political battle ended in approval of The 
Reciprocal Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1949, which allowed the extension of the 
trade deals in the GATT, Truman said that the Act "extends ... our trade agreement 
program, free of the crippling restrictions imposed on it in 1948 by the 80th Congress. ,,48 
In the same speech, he also talks about recent agreements made with Canada and Great 
Britain to open the Commonwealth to outside trade.49 Truman had backed all the efforts 
at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, most notably the GA TT accord and the proposals 
to establish an International Trade Organization (ITO), International Monetary Fund 
(lMF) and World Bank.50 Spurred by the successful launch of the IMF and World Bank 
Truman remained steadfast in his continued support for the ITO proposal until finally, in 
1950, he deemed passage impossible. 
Truman's legislative efforts concerning GATT and the ITO were not his only attempts 
to end the protectionist trade practices of European imperial rule. In the spirit of free 
trade, Truman used his prominence to call upon the nations of the world to " ... devise 
their economic and financial policies to support a world economy rather than separate 
nationalistic economies.,,51 He also used the economic might of the United States to 
provide aid and extend Lend-Lease programs to England since "Extension of this credit 
will enable the United Kingdom to avoid discriminatory trade arrangements of the type 
which destroyed freedom of trade during the 1930's.,,52 
Truman's anti-imperial attitude enjoyed popular public support especially when the 
target was the British Empire, a point not lost on this perceptive politician. Following the 
war, anti-British feelings lurked within America's psyche. 53 Many Americans felt that 
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the British, along with the other European allies, were not sufficiently grateful for the 
support they had received during the war. Additionally, they suspected that any aid 
provided to the war-ravaged European nations would enable the European empires to 
reestablish themselves in the postwar period. 54 One example of such an attitude was a 
telegram in 1947 from a private citizen, Jack Hess, to President Truman expressing his 
anti-British perspective, "IF BEVIN WANTS TO SHARE THE FT KNOX GOLD 
WITH US HOW ABOUT OUR SHARING ENGLANDS COLONIAL EMPIRE WITH 
THEM HERES ONE VOTER REPRESENTING A GROUP WHO IS AGAINST IT" 
[emphasis from original].55 A poll conducted in February 1945 found the majority of 
Americans thought that the United States would have more problems with imperialist 
Britain than Communist Russia.56 At the same time, the State Department and other 
governmental agencies were more than willing to renew efforts to end the British Empire 
and obtain" ... preferential trading rights in British colonies. ,,57 Minutes from a 1947 
National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems 
highlighted ongoing efforts by the State Department to maintain the open markets 
conceded in exchange for a loan by Britain's Ambassador to the United States, Lord 
Halifax, in 1945. At that juncture, Lord Halifax's letter had prohibited Britain and her 
colonies from trade discrimination against external countries.58 American's fundamental 
distrust of British imperialism, linked with the Open Door philosophy embedded in the 
American character, served to keep the issues and rhetoric about colonies in the spotlight 
and part of the political vocabulary of the time.59 Thus, it seems reasonable that Truman 
considered the issue of ending Europe's historic stranglehold on undeveloped parts of the 
world a matter of right and wrong. In Truman's own words, "We wanted to give them a 
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better sort of government and do away with colonialism.,,6o All the same, one cannot 
ignore the practical aspects of Truman's Open Door policies that allowed American 
businesses valuable economic access to foreign markets. Nonetheless, just because the 
United States profited by lowering tariffs this result does not refute the fact that Truman 
thought ending imperial protectionist trade practices would benefit all of humanity and 
promote freedom in the former colonies.61 In the context of supporting global open trade, 
Truman's rhetoric and actions show continuity between his position and FDR's and fit 
with his desire to follow the wishes of the former President. 
Truman declared, "I had always been opposed to colonialism. Whatever justification 
cited at any stage, colonialism in any form is hateful to Americans. America fought her 
own war of liberation against colonialism and we shall always regard with sympathy and 
understanding the desire of people everywhere to be free of colonial bondage. ,.62 
Truman's rhetoric, here and elsewhere, makes it clear that, for him, the issue of 
colonialism was black and white without the normal ambiguities found in foreign affairs. 
Yet, implementing this philosophy would prove to be much more complex, in fact well 
nigh impossible, in the face of competing goals and ideas. In order to provide a structure 
for Truman's straightforward beliefs on colonialism, and to help him navigate the 
unfamiliar and convoluted art of diplomacy he required assistance and advice. 
TRUMAN'S ADVISORS 
To comprehend the foreign policy differences between Roosevelt and Truman it is 
important to understand their familiarity with the subject. FDR had been in office a long 
57 
time and his vast experience and background knowledge of people and prior events 
makes the contrast between him and his newly elected Vice-President even more blatant. 
The inexperienced Truman moved into the post overnight and did not even have the 
normal two-month preparation period that President-elects routinely enjoy. In fact, 
Truman was Vice-President only eighty-two days before Roosevelt died. Of those 
eighty-two days, FOR was in Washington D.C. with his new Vice-President for just thirty 
days.63 Truman's selection as the Vice-Presidential nominee had been politically 
expedient and no closeness existed between the two men. There was nothing in their 
relationship that caused the secretive FOR to embrace and confide in Truman.64 For 
instance, when FOR and his closest advisors went to Yalta for his last conference with 
the Allies in February of 1945 he left Truman behind to tend to ceremonial duties and 
preside over the Senate. In addition, none saw a need to invite Truman to attend any high 
level foreign briefings at the White House during his brief period as Vice-President.65 
Totally unprepared, Truman was plunged headlong into a situation where he had to 
address the multiple activities and emergency situations of a nation at war while still 
learning how to do hisjob.66 Early on, he told one of his cabinet members, "I know 
nothing of foreign affairs and I must acquaint myself with them at once.,,67 Additionally, 
he had no advisors or trusted contacts of his own about matters of foreign policy prior to 
taking over in the White House.68 Truman's lack of experience and preparation forced 
him to rely heavily on FOR's advisors.69 
Truman's personality was such that he felt obligated to consider all available facts and 
then coordinate his decisions. This propensity reinforced his reliance upon advisors. In 
spite oflater gaining a reputation for decisiveness, Truman's policy pronouncements 
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were" ... the product of careful political or diplomatic planning and group consensus, 
not individual whim.,,7o Thus Truman's style forced him to rely far more heavily on 
foreign affairs advisors than had Roosevelt. 71 This reliance on advisors was especially 
true at the beginning of his time in office. The first day on the job, he called in Edward 
Stettinius, the Secretary of State, to prepare primers covering all foreign policy issues and 
the upcoming United Nations' Conference that was to be the first item in the queue.72 
Therefore, to understand Truman's foreign policy actions one must also understand his 
advisors and their positions. While President Truman's advisors were many and varied, 
the following agencies and people had the most influence and impact upon shaping the 
President's official colonial position. 
TRUMAN'S VIEW OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT 
Truman belittled the State Department membership as a bunch of pretentious, self-
serving elitists.73 He referred to State Department personnel as the "striped pants 
boYS.,,74 Nevertheless, he relied upon them either through necessity or, at least in some 
cases, close personal relationships that developed based on respect and admiration such 
as the associations he had with Secretaries of State George Marshall and Dean Acheson.7s 
When pressed by reporters about foreign policy decisions, Truman explained that he did 
not want to follow FDR's method of internalizing foreign affairs rather, " ... the State 
Department is set up for the policy of handling foreign policy operations, and the State 
Department ought to take care ofthem.,,76 The early State Department's goals were 
familiar they" ... wanted the British to reform their imperial practices, dissolve the 
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sterling bloc, accept full convertibility of the pound into dollars, and adhere to the 
principles of open and nondiscriminatory trade.,,77 
An example that shows pursuit of these goals comes from one of Truman's early State 
Department advisors Loy Henderson, Director of Near Eastern Affairs, who articulated 
the Department's position on European colonies in the Middle East. Henderson argued 
that the United States had failed in 1919 with the establishment of the League of Nations 
and had failed again in stopping the French and British from securing colonies in the 
aftermath of the First World War thereby closing those markets to outside competition. 
He put forth the opinion that the United States should assert itself and prevent a similar 
situation from developing in the Middle East with the Soviet Union and European powers 
by pursuing an Open Door policy in the region.78 The Truman administration adopted 
this approach for future dealings in both the Middle East and Iran. The next set of 
advisors would turn out to be more problematic. 
Besides officials in the State Department, Truman also received advice early in his 
tenure on the issue of colonialism from another profession, members of which he both 
maligned and praised, Generals.79 According to an early-unpublished draft of Truman's 
memoirs, in May and June of 1945 Ambassador to China, Patrick J. Hurley, a former 
Army General, and General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commander of American forces in 
China provided Truman an assessment of the true situation in the Far East. They also 
provided some rather pointed recommendations on how to handle the imperialist powers 
of Europe. 80 They included the following, 
The paramount political issue in Asia for many years has been the issue between 
Democracy and imperialism. We supported Chinese Democratic aspirations 
against the imperialism of Japan. The question is will we now permit British, 
French and Dutch imperialists to use the resources of the American democracy to 
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reestablish imperialism in Asia. ... The appointment of Lord Louis [Lord Louis 
Mountbatten, British Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia Theater] or any 
other imperialist as Commander in China would constitute nullification of 
American principles and achievements in China. . .. All the Imperialist nations 
have done has been in an endeavor to recover their colonial possessions largely by 
the use of American and Chinese resources and reestablish the prestige of 
. 'al' 81 Impen Ism. 
This same series of cables from Hurley include particulars on Hong Kong and Indochina. 
In the case of Hong Kong Truman received the following advice: 
We have two major pressing controversies affecting the present military 
situation and the future of democracy and imperialism in Asia that are still unsettled 
. . .. Last March 8th President Roosevelt said to Wedemeyer and me ... he still 
insisted that the British return Hongkong to China. Roosevelt said that if Churchill 
refused to agree to this he would go over Churchill's head to the King and to 
Parliament. . .. Churchill told me that Hongkong would be returned to China only 
'over my dead body' ... , My opinion is that if we have a firm policy on Hongkong 
Britain will yield ... in China we may find that another great power that claims to 
be anti-imperialistic may adopt imperialism as a policy ... to combat British 
imperialism in China ... , You could also say that no credit or additional gifts at 
the expense of the American taxpayer [more Lend Lease] would be given to Britain 
until Britain shows a more understanding attitude towards the American policy on 
Hongkong and towards Democracy the world over. I think you would find Britain 
still amenable to reason. 82 
Later Hurley goes on to discuss Indochina, another colonial issue that would cause angst 
for the United States for decades to come: 
1944 President Roosevelt directed me to inform General Wedemeyer that no 
policy would be promulgated on Indochina until after a forthcoming combined staff 
conference. The President also directed me to keep him informed as to activities of 
British-French-Dutch missions in Southeastern Asia. The President had already 
discussed the Indochina situation with me personally. He was not pleased with the 
fact (1) that Vichy French ofIndochina had collaborated with Japan (2) he was in 
favor of establishing a United Nations or international trusteeship under whose care 
and tutelage Indochina could secure independence according to the principles of the 
Atlantic Charter. Neither General Wedemeyer nor myself has ever been given a 
definite ""Titten directive on Indochina political policy. ... The French 
Ambassador and military mission have become exacting in their demand for 
American support for French activities in Indochina. The French demand 
American war supplies as a matter of right. ... In my last conference with 
President Roosevelt I informed him ... the French, British and Dutch were 
cooperating to prevent the establishment of a United Nations Trusteeship for 
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Indochina. The imperialist leaders believe that such a trusteeship would be a bad 
precedent for the other imperialistic areas in Southeast Asia.83 
Hurley goes on to explain that he had requested written instructions from FDR with 
respect to Indochina and was renewing that request with the new President. Roosevelt's 
only response to Hurley's request for clear and explicit directives had been that the San 
Francisco Conference would set up some kind of trusteeship program under the auspices 
of the United Nations who would help develop the trustee and grant them independence 
with they were ready. Hurley sought clarification about the apparent change by the 
United States at the San Francisco Conference where the old imperial powers received 
trustee control and not the United Nations. Since this result contradicted, what he had 
understood from FDR Hurley was anxious to know the current guidelines. He had 
queried the State Department but had not received any clarification. Hurley said the 
troubling aspect of the situation was that Lord Mountbatten, Commander South East Asia 
Theater, was already using Lend-Lease and numerous other American resources and 
supplies to reestablish the French in Indochina.84 Truman replied in June 1945, "I fully 
appreciate the frank statement of the military situation in China ... and your equally 
frank estimate of the world wide political intentions of those European Nations that are 
allied with us in this war. You may be assured that these matters are receiving full 
consideration in America's planning for the future .. ,. Many of the questions presented 
in your above noted communications may be discussed in the forthcoming tripartite 
conference.',85 As seen from this series of messages, Truman was aware early on about 
the imperialist intentions of the European powers in Asia, FDR's position on the subject, 
the use of American resources to augment English and French efforts in Indochina and 
the lack of clear guidance for those in the field. In this case, the new President did not 
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heed the advice as he and his administration moved into the immediate postwar period 
and the beginnings of the Cold War. While Hurley provided some advice on foreign 
policies and issues dealing with colonial territories of the European empires, other better-
known advisors also weighed in on the subject to varying degrees. First examined are the 
Secretaries of State that served as Truman's primary advisors on foreign affairs. 
TRUMAN'S SECRETARIES OF STATE 
Unlike the long-serving Roosevelt, who ran his own foreign policy and had little need 
for a Secretary of State other than to oversee the State Department's bureaucracy, the less 
experienced Truman relied on the men who occupied that position. In fact, Truman 
ended up appointing four different men to the post while in office. The first two, Edward 
Stettinius and James Byrnes had limited influence on the new President. Truman wrote 
of Stettinius, his first Secretary of State, as "a fine man, good looking, amiable, 
cooperative, but never an idea new or 0Id."s6 Stettinius had limited experience in the job 
since Roosevelt appointed him late in 1944 as caretaker for the department. Truman 
replaced Stettinius within a few months with Byrnes, his personal candidate for the 
office. 87 Byrnes had served as an unofficial sub-president for domestic affairs during 
Roosevelt's third term and he commanded such respect around the nation's capital that he 
warranted some cabinet level position in the new administration. Truman's association 
with his second Secretary of State was initially cordial even though Byrnes had competed 
with Truman for the job as Roosevelt's Vice-President in the 1944 election.88 
Nevertheless, their relationship soured over time. Byrnes' obvious belief that he was 
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much better qualified for the job of President than Truman, his subsequent mediocre 
running of the State Department and his disregard of Truman's wishes finally ended with 
his systemic marginalization. He submitted his resignation in early 1947.89 The next two 
Secretaries of State had different associations and long-term relationships that would 
fundamentally influence Truman's foreign policies and related issues of colonialism. 
Truman's third Secretary of State, who he described as "one of the most astute and 
profound men 1 have ever known,,90 was the universally admired General George C. 
Marshall. Truman always treasured Marshall's friendship and this closeness produced a 
great rapport between the two men during both the Four-Star General's time at the State 
Department and later when he took over the Department of Defense.91 For example, 
when Marshall asswned the role as Secretary of State Truman said, "I am hoping that 
Gen. Marshall will take the striped pants boys for a ride.',92 Truman often referred to 
Marshall as one of the greatest Americans ever and never had a disparaging remark to say 
about him during or after his time in office.93 One of the few points of contention 
between the two men was on an issue of colonialism. Marshall opposed ending the 
British mandate in Palestine to allow the founding of a Jewish State in the region. 
Marshall felt that the presence of an official Jewish country in the Arab-dominated oil-
rich region would be a source of unending conflict and a threat to the United States' long-
term security. 94 Despite this disagreement, Truman and Marshall worked well together 
and fought to end American isolationism. In fact, as time went on Truman went well 
beyond what FDR had envisioned during the Second World War as America's role in the 
postwar world.95 A close aide, Clark Clifford, said that the new President had one great 
aptitude and that it "was Harry Truman's capacity to groW.,,96 
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Truman and his evolving foreign affairs team came up with a number of unheard of 
diplomatic policies. Some of these policies affected the issue of European colonialism. 
For instance, Truman was talking about the Marshall Plan and the issue of granting 
freedom to lands under colonial rule when he said, "In all the history of the world ... we 
are the first great nation to create independent republics from conquered territory, Cuba 
and the Philippines.,,97 Truman also had serious disagreements with Churchill in the 
early development stages for the Marshall Plan according to Joseph O. Feeney, an 
assistant to Truman in the White House. Truman had explained that the British 
government and Churchill particularly, did not like the plan for they sensed that it would 
allow the United States to interfere in their internal affairs. Feeney described the 
situation, ~' ... they met quite frequently ... But each time, they'd have an argument, and 
a strong one, and Mr. Churchill was not very happy about the Marshall plan. He wanted 
to keep the British Empire as it was, and he wanted nothing to interfere with it. 
Moreover, there was some talk at that time about India, you know, breaking away from 
the empire. Mr. Churchill was violently opposed to that -- violently opposed -- at that 
time.,,98 The Marshall Plan actually helped the European powers with their colonial 
holdings by providing supplies that cost millions of American dollars that the empires 
then administered to the 10cals.99 Management of the Marshall Plan by the State 
Department in reality produced an American policy that placed the welfare of European 
powers, and restoration of their former worldwide eminence, ahead of concerns about 
other regions of the globe. Ioo 
The next clos~ advisor examined was Truman's longest running Secretary of State, 
Dean Acheson. Acheson's influence on Truman as his chief advisor on foreign policy is 
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well known and their relationship with respect to foreign affairs may even have eclipsed 
that of General George Marshall. Their rapport far exceeded any bond that Tnunan had 
established with Edward Stettinius or James Byrnes. Initially, along with other senior 
State Department advisors such as W. Averell Harriman and Robert Lovett with their Ivy 
League backgrounds, this key advisor seemed to be an Anglophile and by inference pro-
imperialist. 101 Acheson even admitted that he was unabashedly supportive of the British 
as a people and said, "My own attitude had long been, and was known to have been, pro-
British.,,102 Moreover, Acheson often stated he believed that American and British aims 
were the same and in the best interests of West em Civilization.103 However, Acheson's 
feeling about Great Britain and any possible collusion with friends in the British 
government to influence Truman was blunted by the fact that when he became the United 
States' senior diplomat the British were under Labour Party control. That same Labour 
Party had been trying for years to divest itself of some of the more bothersome colonies 
and reestablish itself as the heart of a Commonwealth of Nations. 104 Besides, Acheson 
said in reference to a question about special treatment for Great Britain, "Of course a 
unique relation existed between Britain and America-our common language and history 
insured that. But unique did not mean affectionate. We had fought England as an enemy 
as often as we had fought by her side as an ally.,,105 More relevant to the United States' 
colonial policy and the Truman administration was his perpetuation of the belief that 
Europe was the centerpiece of American foreign policy. John Cady, an associate in the 
State Department, described him as conservative and European oriented.106 This Euro-
centric outlook would not produce rejection of the Truman White House's anti-colonial 
stance but would instead marginalize its importance. 107 
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ELEANOR ROOSEVELT 
Eleanor Roosevelt was one of the few champions for the rights of people in the 
various colonies around the world who advised Truman regularly. By this time, she was 
a powerful Democrat Party elder who could mobilize voters on behalf of candidates. 
Many Americans admired her for her social causes and considered her the public keeper 
ofFDR's legacy. These attributes made her an influential person in the nation's capital 
and across the country. She regularly received invitations to important events around the 
world, the national press often quoted her, and she had direct access to key governmental 
leaders to include the President. lOS Eleanor Roosevelt was a person that politicians 
disregarded at their peril. As a show of respect, and in recognition of her universal 
popularity,I09 Truman had appointed the former First Lady as a delegate to the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1946.110 He also developed a close friendship with her 
based upon mutual respect and kept up regular correspondence with her throughout her 
life. She and Truman ended up exchanging 254 private letters from 1945 to 1960.111 She 
was always ready with advice in those letters and scolded Truman one time for wasting 
time writing a lengthy letter in longhand when newly in the job and feeling overwhelmed 
by the position. In the same letter, she told him to trust in his own counsel over others 
around him.112 Later, at a low point in the Presidency. she told friends that Truman's 
problem was that "he had the wrong sort of people around him."lI3 EVen so, she had no 
compunctions about sending Truman her own advice concerning foreign affairs. 
In a series of letters to Truman in the White house a number of times she raised the 
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issue of rights for people subjected to colonial rule and the general issue of imperialism. 
Truman, in turn, talked to her about his efforts in the international arena, for instance 
assuring her that he was trying to draw the British out of their imperialistic Sterling Bloc 
and into more open trade practices. I 14 In a 1947 letter, Eleanor Roosevelt told Truman 
that the United States should not assume the imperialistic policies of Churchill in the 
Near East for it would undermine the spirit of democracy in the region. She also warned 
Truman of the future failure of French imperialism, "France has been so long in North 
Africa and accomplished so little in raising the standard of living and in giving the people 
education that I do not know how long they can hope to keep their power 
unchallenged."II5 While serving in the United Nations she warned Truman that, 
The race question has become a very vital one since much of the feeling is that of 
the colored races against the white race. We are classed with the colonial powers as 
having exploited them because our businessmen in the past have exploited them, so 
we have no better standing than the United Kingdom or any other colonial power. I 
think we have to reckon with this in our whole world outlook because we will need 
friends badly and it surprising how few we have in spite of all we have done for other 
people in the past. 116 
She also voiced concern that Acheson and other advisors were too sympathetic to the 
British cause and urged Truman to take care. II7 She was also able to use these advisors at 
other times to influence indirectly Truman to side against the colonial desires of the 
. European powers. For instance, she urged Acheson in the early 1950s not to yield to 
French pressure in Tunisia when the French were trying to hold onto that colony in spite 
of international press. I IS Lastly, on the related concept of her husband's Four Freedoms 
she was an exceptionally active advocate for the United Nations' Declaration of Human 
RightS. 119 She pressured Truman about the declaration when the vote was coming up for 
ratification in the United States and Truman approved of her casting the United States' 
68 
affirmative vote for the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights that indirectly supported an 
end to colonialism. 12o Eleanor Roosevelt was perhaps the single most successful of the 
Truman advisors in bringing the colonial issue to the President's attention. However, 
none of his closest foreign policy advisors, Acheson or Marshall, supported the return of 
European imperial domination to the international scene. Nor did they appear to argue 
that there was a need to perpetuate colonial rule. However, the Euro-centric view of the 
world found in Truman's State Department and among his key advisors sometimes 
worked to the disadvantage of other regions of the world. These same State Department 
officials and Ambassadors backed policies to break the European empire's economic 
stranglehold on their colonies and expressed support for FDR's anti-colonial outlook. 
Truman drew upon the counsel of these foreign policy advisors and it seems apparent that 
no one backed the permanent reinstatement of the colonial empires. Other events also 
conspired to bring the issue of imperial rule up in the course of policy-making in the 
administration. 
POTSDAM 
At the Potsdam conference from 16 July to 2 August 1945; Admiral Ernest King, an 
early and influential advisor said of Truman, "Watch the President ... This is all new to 
him but he can take it.,,121 Even before the start of the conference, Churchill was 
pressuring Truman to occupy Yugoslavia. Truman's reply was that the territorial issues 
needed to be settled in an organized manner unlike the post-First World War 
"uncontrolled land-grabbing.,,122 Years later Truman wrote Dean Acheson that in coming 
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to the conference he had wanted to coordinate with the other powers and arrange 
benevolent approaches on the subjects of free waterways, and self-governance for all 
enemy nations, conquered lands and territories. 123 Additional discussions beyond spheres 
of influence and atom bombsl24 did occur but not in the idealistic tones that Truman had 
hoped. For instance, Churchill tried to secure American support for imperial interests by 
offering basing for American forces in colonial ports around the world. As Churchill 
said, "We could add 50 percent to the mobility of the American fleet.,,125 As for former 
Italian colonies, from the beginning Churchill had expressed a desire for the British to 
maintain control of those regions until final disposition.1 26 The destiny of Libya, Eritrea 
and Somaliland remained vague because the conference attendees decided that their fate 
should be resolved as part of a later 1947 peace treaty for Italy. 127 During the later treaty 
talks, the United States' position was that the colonies should become British-supervised 
trusteeships while the French wanted to return the colonies to Italian control rather than 
let the British administer them. 128 As for Truman's stance at the treaty talks, a senior 
State Department official observed that Roosevelt and Truman's position regarding to the 
Italian colonies was that they should be trusteeship territories and eventually receive their 
independence. 129 Libya would gain its independence in 1951 but Somaliland would have 
to wait until 1960. 130 Participants also discussed the disposition of Indochina, which 
forces of Japan still occupied at the end of the war. The plan was to hand over the 
northern part to the Chinese and the southern to the British who would then tum it back 
over to France, a fellow European empire. 131 This arrangement was a natural outgrowth 
ofFDR's earlier agreement to let the British take over Theater Command in the region 
and therefore not considered a major policy change by the new President. In a similar 
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vein, the United States and Soviet Union would divide control of Korea. These decisions 
seemed to be a practical and temporary solution as Japanese forces departed the 
battlefield but no one could foresee the lasting effects they would have for United States 
policy. These choices put a pro-colonial face on Truman's foreign policy though in 
actuality, the Truman administration was pinning its hopes on the United Nations as the 
forum to resolve such international problems in a rational and peaceful manner. 
UNITED NATIONS 
Another early indicator of President Truman's intentions concerning European 
colonialism was the establishment of a new world body to replace the failed and ridiculed 
League of Nations. In fact, Truman's first foreign affairs decision on 13 April 1945, his 
first day in the Oval Office, was to go forward with the United Nations program as 
planned. 132 That choice was to continue with the scheduled San Francisco Conference 
intended to form the United Nations that ran from April through June of 1945.133 This 
decision was not surprising since in 1943 then-Senator Truman had gone on a cross-
county speaking tour promoting internationalism sponsored by the United Nations 
Association. 134 Further, he believed that, " ... it was what Roosevelt had wanted, and it 
had to take place if we were going to keep the peace.,,135 Truman also said in his 
memoirs, "I was trying to profit by the mistakes of Woodrow Wilson .... I hoped that 
we would come out of this war with a going world organization for peace .... ,,136 
Repeatedly, President Truman told members of the State Department that the United 
Nations was "the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy . .,)37 Moreover, Truman's hope was 
71 
that establishing the United Nations would make amends for the United States' failure to 
join the League of Nations in 1919. As with other initial foreign policy decisions Truman 
saw his role as continuing FDR's vision; a new world body led by the United States, that 
could produce a new world order. 138 At the time there was also the tacit desire on the 
part of the American people for the United States to be able, through this new world 
body, to intervene between other powers like the Soviet Union and British Empire. 139 
As for the European empires in general, Truman was concerned about ongoing actions 
in the underdeveloped regions of the world as well as developing events. In his memoirs 
regarding his first year in the White House, he explained the situation, 
Violent resistance movements were developing in North Africa, the Middle East. 
and the redeemed areas of Asia, all in the name of liberation. They sought immediate 
freedom from established colonial powers, who were, of course our allies in the main 
war. We, as a people, have always accepted and encouraged the undeniable right of a 
people to determine its own political destiny. ... But the real problem, as I saw it in 
its application to immediate events, was not one of principle. ... The real problem 
was that of procedure and method. Amid the shambles of a world breaking down, we 
were desperately in need of machinery not only to deal with international disputes but 
also to provide assistance and encouragement to peoples in their peaceful aspirations. 
I was thinking primarily of a world organized for peace and of our plans for the 
United Nations. 140 
In this telling statement, Truman not only expressed a desire to see the end of colonialism 
but also articulated the quandary facing the United States government. Administration 
officials, including Truman, were aware of the social forces of growing rebellion in the 
European colonies energized by the Second World War. While philosophically 
supporting the right to freedom for all peoples they feared the instability that could occur 
in a fragile world just coming out ofa devastating world war. Additionally, national self-
interest by the United States, as well as others, encroached on Roosevelt's idealistic 
wartime hope that the United Nations would be strong enough to administer order. 141 
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Truman's initial hope, at least according to his public words, was that the United Nations 
was the right tool to bring about the changes needed in the underdeveloped regions of the 
globe in a slow and orderly manner that would not sacrifice stability in the postwar 
world. In a 1948 speech, Truman boasted that the United Nations had succeeded in 
getting the British and French to withdraw from Syria and Lebanon, and the Dutch to 
secure a truce with the Indonesians, though he did not mention anything about the 
pressure the United States had exerted in these situations. 142 In a 1950 report to Congress 
Truman stressed that the United Nations continued to be "Point I of our foreign 
policy.,,143 In the same speech Truman emphasizes that the mechanism to provide 
"advancement of trust areas and other non-self-governing territories is steadily being 
fostered through the cooperation of administering states and the United Nations."I44 In 
his memoirs years after his Presidency, Truman continued to assert that the United 
Nations was the only appropriate mechanism for solving problems in territories overseen 
by the Europeans since they were the ones capable of addressing the transition from 
colony to independent state in a rational, systemic manner that would avoid chaos. 
Additionally, when he talked about the British-administered Palestine and the resulting 
birth of Israel he felt that the UN should have dealt more forcefully with the issue and 
claimed that the United States only became involved because of external pressures. 14S 
Scholars can argue that the UN's policies during this time were simply an extension of 
the United States' due to its overwhelming power in the world. However, as seen in the 
next section the United States lacked a cohesive strategy to direct its national might at the 
problem of undeveloped areas still under colonial control. In addition, though the 
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European empires were weaker they were not without influence in the new world body 
and they united to prevent any programs that were not in their national interest. 
TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM 
In addition to the better-known bodies of the United Nations, the Security Council and 
the General Assembly, there was the Trusteeship Council. The Trusteeship Council 
evolved from the old League of Nations' Mandates Commission designed originally to 
control territory previously governed by nations defeated in World War One. FDR saw 
the transformation of the Mandates Commission into the Trusteeship Council as the 
answer to what he perceived as being the biggest world threat, Europe's system of 
imperial rule. The intent was for the council to manage the peaceful transition of 
European colonies to independent states. 146 Under Roosevelt's direction, the State 
Department had worked on the concept as one of their major wartime initiatives and they 
continued to push for adoption in the postwar period. 147 "By the spring of 1944, 
Department of State officials were ready ... They gave the UN a decisive role in 
controlling trust areas, with provisions for inspections and mandatory reports on 
conditions. ... Roosevelt believed that the provisions for inspection and pUblicity would 
be a powerful inducement for more liberal colonial policies.,,148 The State Department 
also included independence as the chief goal for the system. However, as previously 
discussed, FDR was under considerable pressure to reduce the scope of the concept and 
delay any tInal decision until after the war. 149 No one will ever know what Roosevelt's 
intent may have been when he yielded to the British at Yalta. Nonetheless, by agreeing 
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to the delay, his sudden death put the trusteeship issue at Truman's feet to deal with as 
soon as he took office. The actual establishment of the Trusteeship Council during 
Truman's early administration would prove to be a glaring example of the President's 
rhetoric not matching his actions. The American delegation to the 1945 San Francisco 
Conference forming the United Nations allowed the European participants to change the 
wording of the plan from the clear word independence to the more ambiguous word self-
rule and then left it to the discretion of the Europeans which of their colonies to include 
in the trusteeship program. 150 The trusteeship was only official for mandates that had 
existed under League of Nations' agreements and recently captured enemy territories. In 
Truman's defense, considerable pressure existed to weaken the trusteeship's scope of 
operation. There was even fear that Churchill, and the British government, would be 
successful in having the whole trusteeship concept thrown out if the word independence 
remained in the language of the plan. lSI Despite agreeing to the weakening of the plan, 
the State Department did take the lead in insisting on establishment of the trusteeship 
program during the San Francisco Conference. 152 Truman's draft memoirs also indicate 
that he took a far more active role in this process than is implied in the finished version, 
which only specifies that Truman approved a series of instructions for the American 
delegates. 153 The draft memoirs include statements such as this personally issued 
Truman directive, "On April 18 I issued a directive to the delegation on the American 
policy on trusteeship. I stated that at San Francisco it was not proposed to place any 
particular territory under a trusteeship system:,154 Truman then pointed out that at the 
Yalta Conference it had been agreed that non-League of Nation and non-captured 
territories of the war would become part of the program with the approval of the ruling 
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colonial power. 155 Another example of Truman's hands-on approach to the issue of 
trusteeship, not found in the final version of the memoirs, includes "On April 27, I 
received a draft proposal on trusteeship prepared by the American delegation. This draft 
conformed to my general directive of April 18 on trusteeships. This was one of the key 
issues of the conference and I wanted it to be as clear as it could be in every detail of 
technical and legal phrasing.,,156 Even weakened in scope the Trusteeship Council still 
provided a useful forum to help end colonialism by providing a sense of legitimacy to the 
cause of returning self-rule to local people. ls7 Further evidence of the eventual 
magnitude of the program came in a 1951 article that claimed at that time the program 
included 85 different geographical entities, covering almost nine million square miles, 
and a hundred and seventy million individuals in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean. ls8 
The trusteeship concept did have adversaries both in and out of the Truman 
administration. As discussed, Churchill had been an enemy of the trusteeship program 
since its conception and successfully fought at Yalta to remove the European colonies 
from inclusion. 159 Nevertheless, the British had to fight the battle allover again during 
the formation of the UN. During this altercation, the French delegates collaborated with 
the British to resist the mandatory addition of their colonies and they received support in 
their efforts from the United States military. 160 
The American military wanted to retain control over Guam, Samoal61 and "Japanese 
islands seized during the war including the Marshalls, the Marianas, and the Carolina,,162 
island chains (See Figure 1)163. Controlling these geographic assets would give them 
complete control over the lines of communications in that part of the Pacific and the 
ability to control strategic access to a large part of the Asian continent. 1M These bases 
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would also enable the United States to continue to project air and sea forces well beyond 
its continental boundary. 165 Early on, Pentagon officials had argued against discussing 
the disposition of captured Pacific islands while the war was still ongoing and had 
convinced the Department of State to exclude them from the trusteeship talks at 
Dumbarton Oaks and later at the Yalta Conference. At the United Nations Conference to 
get around the all-or-nothing approach to inclusion of territories in the trusteeship 
program a compromise idea arosc. Certain strategic areas within regions initially 
designated as trusteeships, such as certain islands in the Pacific, would now fall outside 
of the Trusteeship Council ' s direct influence. 166 Some 1948 news conferences addressed 
Truman's public position on the subject of the islands when he said, "Those that we do 
77 
not need will be placed under a U.N.O. [United Nations Organization] trusteeship.,,167 he 
said moreover, "that the national defense necessities of the United States will not be 
sacrificed.,,168 The Truman administration did attempt to create a pathway to freedom for 
these island holdings and by 1948 devices such as the South Pacific Commission, 
established under the auspices of the United Nations' Trusteeship program, included the 
mission to prepare the islands for ultimate independence. 169 In addition, the Trusteeship 
Council served as a public forum for colonial issues and was later successful in applying 
pressure on the British government. 170 The issue of trusteeship is a fine example that 
Truman's policy on colonialism is a mixed bag. Truman at first supported the trusteeship 
concept but yielded to internal and external pressures and compromised his position in 
order to address other, higher priority concerns, such as national security issues. 
Another of Truman's advisors, not discussed earlier, played a pivotal role in the 
American military's weakening of the trusteeship program. James Forrestal, Secretary of 
the Navy and the first United States Secretary of Defense, was the leading advocate to 
retain control of the Pacific islands until his departure from the Department of Defense 
and his sudden death in 1949. Forrestal's diaries layout the Department of Defense's 
case for keeping the islands and describe the infighting within the administration. He 
chronicles the idea that the islands were not colonies but "rather 'defense posts' 
necessary to the big power responsible for the security of the area, and their disposition, 
along with that of other strategic frontiers and territorial acquisitions, should be settled by 
the big powers in advance instead of through the proposed trusteeship mechanism."l?l 
The contention that the islands would not be colonies but only controlled by the United 
States because they were strategic defensive positions seems to be rather specious. The 
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end result is still a foreign power controlling a country though the Department of Defense 
argued that the islands could not be considered colonies because the local population 
would be free from the exploitative economic and cultural arrangements that marked 
traditional colonies held by the European empires. l72 The idea of using the islands as 
defense posts first circulated at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and Forrestal's diaries 
provide depth to the administration's behind-the-scenes wrangling over the issue. A 21 
January 1946 entry captured Forrestal's surprise upon finding out that Secretary of State 
Byrnes, with Acheson's encouragement, had pushed Truman to announce that the Pacific 
islands would shortly become part of the Trusteeship program under the control of the 
United Nations. The State Department's thinking on the subject was that following the 
military's lead would result in "reservations of other territory by other nations until the 
non-aggrandizement plan of the Atlantic Charter would be a mockery .... "I73 An 
incensed Forrestal saw Truman that afternoon to counter Byrnes' attempt to change what 
he thought had been settled at the earlier San Francisco Conference. Forrestal also 
criticized Acheson's actions as being unprofessional according to the entry, which is 
sympathetic to Truman. 174 In later entries, Forrestal talks about the need to keep the 
islands out of the trusteeship program and implies that the State Department is working to 
thwart him.17s From Forrestal's dairies it is clear that the issue of colonialism was not a 
static process and that Truman's advisors did not speak with one voice. Truman's 
memoirs reinforce this picture of infighting and conflicting objectives when he says, "In . 
. . meetings with Cabinet members on the question of trusteeships, I found that the State 
Department held views that differed from those of the War and Navy Departments .... In 
the end I sustained the Army and Navy chiefs on the major issue of security of the 
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bases.,,176 This exclusion of strategic areas from United Nations' control would translate 
to changes in the United States position on colonialism even though Truman would have 
preferred to do otherwise. 
Even while agreeing with the military's stance about continued control of the Pacific 
islands Truman was of two minds. In a 6 November 1946 statement, Truman said, "The 
United States is prepared to place under trusteeship ... Japanese Mandated Islands and 
any Japanese Islands for which it assumes responsibilities as result of the Second World 
War.,,177 Yet in the same statement, he talks about the strategic area concept for the 
islands and its presentation to the United Nations' Security Council. 178 Nevertheless, 
after weighing the options Truman decided that retention of these islands was in the 
United States national interest. Regardless of the reasoning behind the decision, the 
exclusion of the islands from the United Nations' trusteeship mandate still troubled 
Truman years later when wrote his memoirs. He explained his feelings, "My attitude was 
always that while it was necessary for us to control certain islands in the Pacific until 
peace was established, these territories should not be closed to the rest of the world. I 
believed we should set up civil governments as soon as possible to replace the military 
governments. Some of the military objected, but while I remained President I intended to 
try to get as near to self-government as we could wherever we had the responsibility.,,179 
The impression one gets is that Truman felt the duty to ensure national security but was 
uncomfortable holding onto the islands indefinitely therefore he attempted to rationalize 
his position by saying that he still supported the Pacific islanders' right to independence 
at the earliest feasible date. 
One should note that the captured islands of the Pacific were not the only holdings of 
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the United States. The future States of Hawaii and Alaska were still territories during 
Truman's administration but did not fit the definition applied to the European colonies. 
Though these territories did not become States until 1959, they were in the process of 
joining the Union. Truman noted in a 1950 public address, "One of the principal reasons 
why I am anxious to see the Territory of Hawaii and the territory of Alaska become 
States is because of their vital importance to the defense and to the welfare of the United 
States of America.,,180 Truman was pushing independence for another territory even 
more rapidly, "The intention of President Roosevelt and the Congress to give early 
freedom to the Philippines ... was the will of the American people, and I was determined 
to carry it through to speedy fulfillment. ... I hoped that by making the Philippines as 
free as we had made Cuba it would have an effect on British, Dutch, and French policy in 
their Far Eastern affairs.,,181 Others in the government also hoped that the European 
imperial powers would emulate the orderly and controlled decolonization of the 
Philippines as practiced by the United States. 182 Independence for the Philippines came 
via Presidential proclamation in 1946 with the caveat that the United States could 
maintain twenty-three military bases on Filipino soil on a ninety-nine year lease. 183 
Truman boasted about the United States' actions in a speech about Puerto Rico's future, 
"It is our pride that this policy was faithfully pursued in the case of the Philippines. The 
people of the Philippines determined that they desired political independence, and the 
Government of the United States made provision to this effect.,,184 
Truman also supported the idea that the citizens of Puerto Rico should have the same 
right to choose their own destiny. In the just mentioned speech, Truman was trying to 
persuade Congress that "It is now time ... to ascertain from the people of Puerto Rico 
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their wishes as to the ultimate status which they prefer, and .... Congress, to grant to 
them the kind of government which they desire.,,185 At the time, various island groups 
advocated diverse options: the right to elect a governor, the ability to become a State in 
the Union, full independence, or designation of Dominion status much like Canada's 
position in the British Commonwealth. 186 Truman's steady and sympathetic view of 
Puerto Ricans remained in spite of the infamous 1950 assassination attempt by Puerto 
Rican separatists. At a press conference after their failed effort Truman said, " ... the 
people of Puerto Rico should have the right to detennine for themselves Puerto Rico's 
political relationships to the continental United States.,,187 He did more for the island 
than any other President had to that point, naming the first native Puerto Rican to be 
Governor, extending Social Security privileges to the people and authorizing the 1951 
referendum at which the people overwhelmingly voted to establish their own Constitution 
and proclaim the Commonwealth of Puerto RicO. 188 Neither Roosevelt nor Truman 
considered placing these territories under United Nations Trusteeship Council control as 
they staunchly advocated for other's colonial territories. Perhaps the reason was that, at 
least according to their rhetoric, both Presidents believed they had a viable plan to permit 
the territorial populace decision-making power over their own destinies unlike the 
subjugation and exploitation demonstrated by the European empires. Truman also 
seemed intent on doing what he could while in office, if unable to confer their freedom he 
pushed for future autonomy. 
The first years of the Truman administration were anti-colonial in both rhetoric and 
policy decisions. Truman saw the United Nations' trusteeship program, not United States 
foreign policy, as the legitimate means to make the anti-colonial program work. Some 
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people may view this as Truman practicing a hands-off policy on the issue but his own 
words indicate that he saw this role as appropriate for the UN, a role that Wilson's 
League of Nations was fated never to have a chance to fulfill. In spite of major 
compromises regarding strategic areas, the core concept of the United Nation's 
trusteeship structure had the constant support of Truman. Moreover, Truman continued 
advocating self-determination for United States' territories, including Pacific islands, and 
supported their right to decide their own fate if in a rather unhurried and methodical way. 
COLD WAR / SHIFTING POLICIES 
As time passed and other foreign policy issues, such as the Cold War, presented 
themselves the issue of colonialism became more difficult for Truman and his 
administration. These new issues encompassed more than just the discussed points that 
focus on the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The world was 
different than it had been before World War Two and, more importantly, had 
fundamentally changed from the world at war that FDR had understood. The situation 
was thus, " ... within the past thirty-five years the world had gone through ... the passing 
of five empires and the drastic decline of two major imperial systems, the French and 
British. These events had altered the historical distribution of power until now there were 
only two major centers of power remaining, the United States and the Soviet Union." I 89 
As the climatic events of the Second World War receded, it was natural for the United 
States to reassess its foreign policy. In the midst of this reassessment, the administration 
had to prioritize competing objectives to include the issue of colonialism and the 
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European empires. 
One of Truman's major policies related to colonialism was a break from FDR's policy 
ideal of reducing Europe's power and significance. The World War had degraded the 
international influence of Europe, reducing it to a level few at that juncture could 
comprehend, including the President of the United States. 190 The European empires, 
were attempting to restore their colonial holdings around the globe even before the war 
ended. However, their efforts to resume control of their colonies in the postwar period 
were proving problematic and Truman, along with others in the American government, 
watched the Europeans with growing concern. The war had devastated home countries 
and reconstruction was essential, a point that troubled the Truman administration. 
Acheson spoke in an interview about the condition of postwar Europe and the United 
States' aid programs to Europe during the Truman administration, "It didn't really strike 
home to us that the British Empire was gone, the great power of France was gone, that 
Europe was made out of four or five countries of 50,000,000 people. I still looked at the 
map and saw that red on the thing, and, by God, that was the British Empire, the French 
Senegalese troops in East Asia and in Germany--all of this was gone to hell. These were 
countries hardly much more important than Brazil in the world.,,191 The empires had not 
yet vanished but their power had dwindled, they were not the same empires that had 
started World War Two. 
WINTER 19471 A WEAKENED BRITAIN AND EUROPE 
Both Europe and Great Britain were still near collapse two years after the end of the 
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war. The war had virtually destroyed the British merchant fleet, and English companies 
had lost foreign capital investments. By 1947, one-half of the factories in Britain had 
shut down and the remaining factories had to close for up to three weeks during the 
winter due to a shortage of fuel. 192 By this point, unemployment had jumped to fifteen 
and halfpercent193 and on the diplomatic front the British had begun informing the 
Truman administration that they were withdrawing from the world scene. 194 A British 
economic white paper at the time described their financial problems as "extremely 
serious" and said the need to reduce troop strength rapidly was self-evident. 195 
The European continent was in even worse shape than Britain with productivity at one 
third of pre-war levels and infrastructure recovery at a snail's pace.196 The French 
economy had suffered under Nazi control and even with prodigious efforts at steel 
production; there still was only half of the amount needed to begin rebuilding. More 
importantly, most of France's meager finances bought food to supply the population 
rather than reconstruction and the other countries in Europe were in no better shape. 197 
Later the Marshall Plan would aid reconstruction on the Continent, but in 1947 even the 
United States recovery efforts were not complete and in the end, Britain received no 
economic support at all via the Marshall Plan. 
The devastating winter of 1947 illuminated the dire condition of Europe, particularly 
Britain, to the American people. The winter was exceptionally severe and a late frost 
destroyed millions of acres of wheat and other critical food crops. 198 Weather conditions 
were dreadful and brought countries to a virtual standstill. On l3 February 1947, Truman 
acknowledged the emergency and announced that he was sending fuel oil, coal and wheat 
shipments to the British Isles and Europe. 199 In a later interview about the winter, he 
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pointed out that Europe had not seen such a crisis since the Middle Ages. He described 
their plight, "People were starving, and they were cold because there wasn't enough coal, 
and tuberculosis was breaking out . . .. The British were broke .... ,,200 At the time there 
was a feeling that Europe's problems were the epicenter of a huge crisis, " ... not only 
had the international system not been rebuilt-it seemed about to collapse entirely.,,201 
The winter of 1947 served to drive home two points about Europe's circumstances. 
First, that Britain, by far the largest colonial power, was not going to regain the 
international might it had enjoyed at the height of the British Empire. Second, that 
France and the other nations of Europe, even with help from the United States, would not 
recover any time soon. These realizations would affect American foreign policy in broad 
terms. From the aspect of imperialism, the Truman administration had to readjust their 
thinking and view the European empires, including Great Britain, not as being in a 
position of strength but rather in a state of weakness that threatened world order. The 
danger of European empires drawing the rest of the world into their conflicts had 
vanished. The continuing plight of a weakened Europe, highlighted by the winter of 
1947, was the catalyst that produced competing objectives for American foreign policy, 
the need to stabilize and rebuild Europe versus ending European colonialism. These 
competing aims were further heighten by Truman's Euro-centrists foreign policy 
advisors. Another factor that played a role in Truman's evolving decision-making 
process was the status of the colonies themselves where the war and postwar 
circumstances destroyed the old European-controlled social order thereby opening the 
way for nationalist movements. These movements increased the instability of the regions 
since they sought immediate self-rule and independence. 
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EUROPEAN COLONIES 
In addition to the Truman administration's concerns with the problems of Europe, 
events in current and fonner colonial holdings also demanded their attention. The newly 
created Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) undertook a series of assessments regarding 
the underdeveloped areas of the world to address this need. Truman's personal copies of 
CIA reports compose the material examined in this section. A general impression 
garnered from the reports was that the disintegration ofthe empires had left fonner 
colonies unprepared for independence or in open conflict with European attempts to 
reassert control. Another general aspect that the reports dealt with was the issue of access 
by the United States' to the resources found in those colonies and fonner colonies. The 
reports are broken down into the major European colonies, first the British, and then 
French and Dutch Empires and they cover some of the major underdeveloped regions in 
the Middle East, Asia and Africa. 
First, a look at the big picture and the general condition ofthe European empires' 
grasp on colonies around the world as described in the intelligence reports. The CIA's 
1948 assessment of European colonialism was that its demise was inevitable. Overall, 
colonies around the globe had increased their efforts to secure freedom since the end of 
the Second World War. Some reasons for the increased nationalism included Japan's 
success during the war in driving European imperialists from the Pacific region, the 
postwar weakness of the Colonial powers, internal socialist movements, general support 
for colonial freedom by other nations including the Soviet Union, and the creation of the 
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United Nations as a means and forum for the liquation of colonial rule. Furthermore, 
every effort by the Europeans to reassure the colonial populations had failed and it was 
unlikely that the breakup would be a controlled and orderly process. The instability in 
these colonies and former colonies was spreading to the rest of the world and perceived 
as a direct threat to American national security. The threat to security was comprised of 
three elements; the loss of military bases, the further weakening of already exhausted 
European allies, and the loss of strategic materials needed by America's economic sector 
and military. The last factor was especially troubling because many strategic materials 
were exclusive to the colonial regions.202 Additionally, the United States' overall foreign 
policy endeavors were at a disadvantage because conflicts between the Europeans and 
colonial populations had tainted local attitudes toward any western nation, including the 
United States. CIA reports in 1951 and 1952 also raised the specter of communism's 
growth, especially in South Asia. As for the Near East, the European powers were trying 
to retain their influence that caused problems for American efforts. The CIA was more 
dismissive of the threat of communism in the Near East than the Far East. 203 
The majority of the CIA reports dealt with the biggest and most powerful of the 
European empires. The overall assessments of the British focused not on how to end the 
British Empire but on the affects, its ultimate decline would have on the international 
scene. The CIA's opinion was that without its colonies Great British lacked the natural 
resources to maintain a position as the number three world power or even a second tier 
power.204 Additionally, they asserted that Britain's problems were economic and grew 
out of a growing loss of industry in the British Isles.205 Furthermore, the ties that bound 
the Commonwealth countries to Britain were weakening and the British no longer 
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exercised their past influence on these former colonies.206 The agency also noted that 
there were fundamental differences in administrating the colonies between the British 
Empire and other colonial powers, especially the French. The report says, "In contrast to 
French colonial theory, which makes representation in the parliament of the metropolitan 
country the goal of colonial political development, the British in general offer their 
colonial peoples a gradual process up the ladder of increasing self-government with 
Dominion Status [sovereign Nation within the British Empire] at the top .... ,,207 The 
overall tone of the CIA reports is sympathetic to Britain, an ally in decline. 
Individual reports about various portions and colonies of the British Empire focused 
on their possible impact on American foreign policies. For example, the CIA points out 
that the newly independent state of India was pursuing a course of neutrality in the 
United StateslUSSR conflict. Additionally, the new nation was redirecting its anger over 
British colonialism towards the United States.20R In the Near East, residual anger of the 
people towards Britain and France had led to general anti-Western feeling making 
American efforts problematic at best.209 In 1948, the CIA held that in spite of problems 
with the British presence in Malaya it nevertheless ensured American access to the area's 
rubber, tin and strategic ports. CIA analysts also predicted that within the next five years 
the British would grant Malaya more independence.2IO Finally, a 1950 report on the 
British colonies of West Africa focuses on strategic materials such as columbite and 
manganese. This report is dismissive oflocal efforts to attain autonomy citing the apathy 
of a large portion of the popUlation. The report said that this apathy, combined with 
efforts by the British to increase the tempo of granting of self-government, would 
preclude any serious problems in the region?)) As with the general reports concerning 
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Great Britain, the specific CIA reports about the colonies or regions are positive in their 
treatment of the British government while focusing on the American perspective. 
The CIA also analyzed France and its colonial holdings in the postwar period. First 
was a 1947 report on the general state of France in which the CIA revealed that the 
French government was attempting to recover international stature lost during World War 
Two. The study said that French leaders considered reestablishment of the French 
Empire the key to regaining the prestige of the worldwide community.212 The report 
stressed this point by saying, "France views its colonies as indispensable to its 
prestige.,,213 The report also pointed out that France was of great strategic importance to 
the United States even though currently in a weakened state as a leader in Western 
Europe?14 A 1950 report on France noted that despite their declared aim of establishing 
a more tolerant policy toward colonies that, "The reforms promised but not implemented 
by the French are being countered by far-reaching native nationalist demands for greater 
freedom, extending in some instances to complete independence and autonomy.,,215 The 
overall view of the French situation is much more negative than the coverage found in 
CIA reports on the British Empire. 
As for French colonies, a series of CIA reports paints a pessimistic picture of their 
future as well as the efforts of the French government. In Tunisia, nationalists were 
increasingly asserting themselves in the affairs of the country and in opposition to the 
French?16 Another description of the rest of Northern Africa said, "While there is no 
immediate danger of a successful revolt in French North Africa, increasing nationalist 
intransigence and continuing French failure to institute a sincere program of reforms may 
tum what is now a political problem into a situation dangerous to peace and to the 
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security of the US.,,217 On the other side of the world, the picture was even gloomier for 
the French Empire. A northern Vietnam Communist movement, with ties to the Chinese 
Communists, was threatening the French presence in Indochina, Vietnam, Cambodia, and 
Laos. The CIA concluded that unless the French appreciably increased the number of 
military forces in the area they would lose control of the region and most assuredly 
Vietnam. The Communists of the Viet Minh movement, augmented by Chinese troops 
and successfully exploiting popular nationalist feelings, were proving more than a match 
for colonial forces. The report continued that given the current situation it was unlikely 
that France would even be able to maintain their strength long enough to establish an 
autonomous Vietnamese govenunent around which the anti-Communist elements could 
rally.218 A CIA estimate during the last year of Truman's Presidency forecasted " ... the 
French will continue their war effort in Indochina. ... However, while insisting upon the 
protection of French interests, the French will attempt to limit their commitments in 
Indochina by demanding additional US financial assistance and by seeking commitments 
for US-UK military support in the defense oflndochina.,,219 The same report predicted 
that the Chinese would not directly intervene in the conflict but would continue to 
increase aid to Viet Minh.22o The CIA reports found in Truman's files were collectively 
negative about France's ability to direct a peaceful and systematic transition to autonomy 
for their colonies, unlike their overall assessment for the British controlled territories. 
The awareness of the CIA reports kept Truman focused primarily on Britain and 
France's colonial problems and therefore the other colonial European powers received 
scant mention. The CIA analyzed the holdings of Belgian, Spain and Portugal in central 
and southern Africa but not to the degree that Britain and France were covered. For 
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example, a report assessing Portugal was blunt when it said the country and its colonial 
holdings, with the exception of airfields in the Azores, could do little militarily or 
economically for the United States.221 Only the Dutch colonies in Indonesia warranted 
any degree of in-depth scrutiny when compared to the French and British assessments. 
The United States' strategic interests in the area, according to the CIA reports, was 
because Indonesia had large oil reserves and provided the majority of the world's 
supplies of tin, rubber, and quinine?22 Furthennore, the Dutch had launched some ill-
advised and ill-fated military operations in the region in an attempt to quell the 
insurrection and reestablish their power. The ramifications from Dutch actions caused 
strategic problems for both the United States and the United Nations.223 The tone in the 
CIA report, "Consequences of Dutch 'Police Action' in Indonesia,,224 is akin to the 
dismal predictions about French colonial efforts. Another point made in both the French 
and Dutch reports was the alarming growth of communism in the underdeveloped regions 
of the world and the consequences this expansion could have upon American foreign 
policy objectives.225 
BIPOLAR WORLD 
An examination of the period, and Truman's Presidency, would be incomplete without 
a look at the Cold War aspects ofthe colonial question. The description of this 
timeframe is one of" ... opposing trends ... development of a bipolar world, and 
continued breakup of old European empires.,,226 The frequency with which the subject of 
communism came up in Truman's 1951 speeches and press conferences indicated that the 
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issue dominated his foreign policy agenda in his later Presidency.227 In a 1948 press 
conference, when asked about world communism, Truman went so far as to say that the 
single source of the world's postwar volatility, " ... lies largely in the attitude of one 
nation-the Soviet Union:,228 As Truman and his administration were abandoning hope 
for cooperation with the Soviet Union and advancing towards a full-blown Cold War the 
question of colonialism, and the United States' approach towards it altered. As the 
European empires lost influence in their colonial regions, the focus shifted to the power 
vacuums created in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. The problem of Communist 
influence at flrst seemed minor but when they successfully exploited the chaos caused by 
precipitous withdrawal of European colonial rule the Truman administration's concerns 
soon grew to eclipse other considerations.229 Some argue that, especially in Africa: 
In the decades after World War II ... the United States refused to press for 
independence and the end of colonialism. The government attempted to follow what 
it considered a middle course, assuring colonial peoples of American sympathy and 
good will while supporting or acquiescing in the continuation of European control .... 
While the search for security pushed anti-colonialism into the distant background in 
the early years of the Truman administration .... 230 
The late 1940s saw public outcry from some of the Black Leadership, centered in the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, claiming that the 
government was not aggressively pursuing the end of colonialism. However, their 
complaint did not gamer much public support since Cold War rhetoric was intensifying 
across the nation.231 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Chief of Staff at the time 
perceived the problems Congress had charting a course through conflicting foreign policy 
objectives: 
We were pushed hard by the colonial powers to support their position in the 
United Nations and not to encourage the independence of the developing areas too 
soon. And we were pushed hard by others who wanted independence for all of the 
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colonies and the trust territories as rapidly as possible. The United States tried to be 
reasonable -- to chart a middle course. We recognized that if the colonies got their 
independence too soon this would put them in a difficult position because they 
wouldn't be able to maintain their economies, they wouldn't have the experience and 
the education and training for their people to survive as new states, at least not to 
make the kind of progress that we had hoped.232 
In the State Department fear of uncontrolled change led many to realize that "They were 
not ready to see the colonial powers give up their colonies as quickly as they ... have.,,233 
Truman rationalized his growing resistance to nationalism by noting that in some cases it 
led to negative consequences under Communist-inspired "extreme nationalism.,,234 
The issue of colonialism also turned into a Cold War propaganda tool. The 
administration grew concerned that the Communists, the Russians in particular, were 
attempting to sway the popular opinion in colonial regions against the United States. The 
former Prime Minister of Greece said, " ... the colonial powers did not consider 
advisable immediately after the war, to admit even to a certain degree that colonialism 
could any longer survive. They thus opened the way for Communists to make the best of 
what Lenin had already marked out: that is, for the Russians to become the champions of 
the peoples' right for self-determination and the pioneers of the abolishment of 
colonialism ... 235 The second part of the Russian message was that the Americans were de 
facto imperialists because of the United States alliances with the European powers. A 
letter from Secretary of State Acheson to Truman about Russian politics playing out in 
the UN General Assembly said, "They have lumped the British and The French together 
with us as the Atlantic warmongers, and have made strenuous appeals ... to the Arab-
Asian bloc.,,236 The Soviet's hijacking of the anti-colonialism message served to weaken 
European power while building Russian goodwill with the people of the colonial 
regions.237 The Soviet anti-colonial message also helped shift the Truman 
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administration's efforts to focus on defeating perceived Communist-sponsored nationalist 
movements such as Ho Chi Minh's in Vietnam. While United States' foreign policy 
simultaneously supported nationalist movements such as in Indonesia that the 
administration portrayed as democratically inspired.238 
Cold War rhetoric also changed the meaning of colonialism and imperialism with 
Truman's public attacks on communism referring to it as Communist imperialism.239 
Truman described communism as having assumed the mantel of the imperialist with all 
the evils inherent to the role. While speaking publicly of the Soviet Union he said, "That 
imperialism seeks to gain its ends by intimidation, by fomenting disorder, and by 
attempts to force internal collapse.,,24o One of Truman's speeches talked about the 
Russians having imperial aspirations, 
In the Far East, Communist imperialism presents us with another threat. There 
we see many new nations emerging, as our own countries once did, from colonial 
status to full independence .... But Communist imperialism has fallen upon these 
new nations with its weapons of internal subversion and external attack. It seeks 
to overpower them before they are strong enough to stand alone?41 
In yet another speech Truman spoke of Russia as creating a new brand of colonialism, "It 
embarked on a new colonialism--Soviet style. This new colonialism has already brought 
under its complete control and exploitation many countries which used to be free 
countries.,,242 The 1950 capstone document of the Truman administration's fight against 
communism, NSC-68, also defined the Soviet Union's actions in negative terms as 
"Russian Imperialism.,,243 With all the Cold War rhetoric, the American people's stance 
about colonialism altered. The British Ambassador to the United States at the time said, 
"Anti-colonialism in the United States today is a traditional attitude rather than an active 
crusading force ... the broad masses of the American people, including the liberals, are 
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convinced that the supreme danger confronting their civilization is not old-fashioned 
I . I' b d . ,,244 co oma Ism ut mo em conunumsm. 
LATER TRUMAN POLICIES 
Even in the midst of the all-encompassing Cold War, there were several foreign policy 
programs directed at the problems of European colonialism or as Truman called it "The 
old Imperialism.,,245 At the end of his tenure, Truman spoke with pride about his 
administration's anti-colonial stance, "In the far East we have helped to create and 
strengthen a ring of new and independent nations from India to Japan. We have helped 
600 million people to make their way from colonial subjection or dependency to 
independent self-govemment.,,246 Truman's response to the international problems of the 
latter 1940s was development of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Moreover, 
he launched the Point IV Program for regions of the world that had formerly been 
European colonies?47 Professor Robertson's book calls the Point IV Program "an 
acknowledgement that the nineteenth-century era of empire was over, a recognition of 
desire of independence for new states and of the social revolutions within them as people 
began to ask ... for something more than subsistence and subservience,,248 
The Point IV Program was first unveiled in Truman's 1949 inaugural address. This 
program was the fourth point offered as part of a series of foreign policy initiatives to 
provide support to the undeveloped and colonial regions of the world.249 Truman 
described the Point IV Program as a way to "share our store of know-how and capital to 
help these people develop their economies and reshape their societies.,,25o He went even 
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further to say that, the Point IV Program had "nothing in common with either the old 
imperialism of the last century or the new imperialism of the Communists.,,251 In 
addition to serving as an altruistic alternative to imperialism, the program had other 
benefits. Truman personally described the Point IV Program as a way to counter 
"Communist propaganda,,252 and increase the underdeveloped countries' ability to 
"produce strategic materials which are essential to the defense and economic health of the 
free world.,,253 By the last year of Truman' s Presidency, he boasted of the success of the 
Point IV Program with "technical and economic missions in 40 countries.,,254 Indeed, the 
program spent millions of dollars during Truman's Presidency and ultimately evolved 
into additional aid programs?55 The underlying objectives of the Point IV missions, in 
Truman's words, were to " ... encourage stabilized governments in underdeveloped 
countries in Africa, South America, and Asia, we could encourage the use of the 
development of those areas some of the capital which accumulated in the United 
States.,,256 In his memoirs, Truman would say that the positive effect from the capital 
and technical support of the Point IV Program would be similar to the European empires' 
investment in early America without the colonial baggage.257 Regardless of the 
reasoning behind the program, Truman felt that: 
Point Four was aimed at enabling millions of people in underdeveloped areas H' 
raise themselves from the level of colonialism to self support and ultimate 
prosperity. All of the reports which I had received from such areas of the world 
indicated that a great many people were still living in an age almost a thousand 
years behind the times. In many places this was the result of long exploitation for 
the benefit of foreign countries, of developments for foreign benefit rather than for 
the interest of native peoples. This was the curse of colonialism, and I, for one, 
have always hoped to see it disappear. 258 
The Point Four Program was the centerpiece of Truman's self-described anti-colonial 
foreign policy in the latter period of his Presidency. The Point IV Program was also 
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evidence that Truman did not forsake Roosevelt's legacy of anti-colonialism. Rather, 
Truman and his administration amended the policy to address current events and the 
changing foreign policy priorities of the new Cold War era. The effectiveness of the 
Point IV Program was debatable259 but at least its rhetoric was against both the old 
European colonialism and the new Communist imperialism. 
INDIVIDUAL EUROPEAN EMPIRES 
In addition to a general foreign policy program dealing with native aspirations around 
the world, Truman's foreign policy also responded to individual problems arising from 
the various European colonies and territorial holdings. This section looks at three major 
European empires and the Truman administration's response to each of the countries' 
colonial policies. The three major powers, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and France, 
each had sizable colonial holdings and each dealt with colonial crises during the latter 
part of the Truman administration. The United States' decision in each crisis provides 
insight not only into the administration's thinking but also offers some suggestions as to 
Truman's feelings on the subject. 
Great Britain 
The first nation examined is Great Britain, by far the largest and most powerful 
empire. As noted, Britain was the United States' closest ally and had the distinction of 
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going through political upheaval and changing political parties in the postwar period. 
Gone were the Conservative Party and its leader Churchill, the great defender of the 
British Empire. Replacing him was Clement R. Attlee and his Labour Party. 
The Labour Party assumed power before the end of the Potsdam Conference in 1945 
and set about to change the empire.260 Their objective was to transform the British 
Empire into a Commonwealth and do away with colonial rule in a number of 
territories.261 Besides the professed benevolent aspects of this program by the Labor 
Party, this effort was really a practical attempt by a British government with limited 
resources to preserve the nation's international standing by leading a modem 
Commonwealth instead of an archaic empire.262 
Early in 1946, the Labour Party-led government announced that in 1947 it would grant 
independence to India, their most important colony, thus beginning the nation's first 
mcYor postwar wave of decolonialization.263 Moreover, by 1948, Burma and Ceylon 
achieved statehood. During this same period, the British were engaged in military 
operations in Malaya264 but by the early 1950s, the Malayan troubles had been resolved 
to the point that successful talks for independence began.265 Britain also announced plans 
to reduce their presence in the Middle East and they removed various military forces 
from Syria and Egypt along with a complete withdrawal from Jordan and Palestine 
(Israel).266 Finally, on Christmas Eve 1951 Libya gained its independence.267 By the 
time Churchill returned to the role of Prime Minister in late 1951, the breakup of the 
British Empire was irreversible though he did try to slow the process while in office.268 
The Labour Party's efforts to transform the British Empire left little for the Truman 
administration to do regarding ending British colonialism. Churchill, self-described 
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defender of the British Empire and bane to Roosevelt's anti-colonial efforts, was 
temporarily out of power. For the next few years, Churchill would operate as the 
opposition party leader focusing on domestic politics and select initiatives such as his 
Iron Curtain Speech in Fulton Missouri where he tried to raise international concerns 
about the growing Communist threat from Russia.269 Nevertheless, while Truman and his 
administration were publicly supportive of Attlee's efforts to convert the British 
Empire270 at the same time the Department of State continued to push Britain to comply 
with their 1945 agreement to open British colonial markets to American businesses and 
end the imperialist trade bloc.271 A British diplomat of the period said that the American 
State Department was single-minded regarding the liberalization of trade. 272 Similarly, 
the administration kept up the pressure to open markets in the British-dominated Middle 
East.273 During a series of riots in 1949, the State Department applied diplomatic 
pressure to accelerate independence for Libya, and the British came to believe that the 
Americans were trying to use Libya to spark independence movements in the region.274 
The Truman administration tried unsuccessfully to convince Britain to negotiate an 
orderly transfer of power with Egyptian nationalists while still maintaining a lasting 
military presence, in the form of basing for aircraft and naval access, in the region.275 
The decline of the British Empire and associated withdrawal of forces from Greece 
precipitated Truman's deVelopment of the Truman Doctrine that called for the United 
States to fill the growing power vacuum while combating communism.276 British 
withdrawal from other regions ultimately also played a role in Truman's decision to exert 
the power of the United States. Yet, Truman did not mean for this change to establish the 
United States as a replacement who would continue European colonialism. Rather, he 
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intended to use this new approach as a means to pursue his well~documented anti~ 
Communist agenda. 277 
Netherlands 
The Netherlands provided a different story from the British efforts to divest 
themselves of colonial rule. The Dutch had experienced brutal treatment under the 
Nazi's, the countryside was devastated and during the course of the war they had lost 
control oftheir colonies to Imperial Japan.278 Dutch recovery efforts included restoring 
their dominion over Indonesia colonies after the British had secured the region?79 By 
1947, their efforts had turned into open warfare with the natives and in 1949 the Dutch 
colonial administration finally admitted defeat and withdrew from the region.28o 
In this case, the United States put significant pressure on the Dutch government to end 
its military efforts to reestablish control.281 This diplomatic pressure by the United States 
occurred despite the powerful European-first bloc in the State Department that initially 
tried to thwart American diplomatic efforts to end Dutch colonial rule. The motivation 
behind supporting the Dutch in regaining imperial power included the desire to help the 
Netherlands recover from the war and a belief that the Dutch could better extract 
important raw materials from the region.282 In this case, one of Truman's closest 
advisors, then Secretary of State Marshall, was the person who overruled the 
Department's Euro-centrists who saw the Netherlands as a client state.283 A senior State 
Department official at the time remembered Marshall's guidance, "he felt that we had to 
live up to the policies of the U. N. Charter with respect to Indonesia, and to affirm -- call 
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it anti-colonial, perhaps it was -- the need for the independence of Indonesia.,,284 
American policy towards Indonesia had originally been one of encouraging both sides to 
compromise but the United States became overtly anti-colonial when the Dutch failed to 
agree to reasonable demands of the Indonesian nationalists.z85 
In late 1949, Truman publicly granted the newly formed United States of Indonesia 
one hundred million dollars of Point IV Program funds to aid the country in its transition 
to self-government.286 The fact that American intelligence agencies deemed the 
nationalist movement in Indonesia to be free of Communist influences made support by 
the Truman administration and the American public that much easier.281 This situation is 
also a good example of some of the unintended consequences that can occur in foreign 
policy. As American and international public opinion swung to support the Indonesian 
nationalists the United States government pressured the Dutch to accede to the 
nationalists demands. This pressure was partly due to the government reflecting the will 
of the people but the fact that the belligerent Dutch military was dressed and equipped 
with American Lend-Lease supplies also embarrassed the administration.288 In this 
particular case, Truman and his administration put an anti-colonial policy into action that 
helped to secure Indonesia's independence?89 
France 
France had suffered as much or more than the Netherlands and fared worse than many 
other parts of a dysfunctional Europe. The country endured German subjugation and the 
fighting had devastated a large part of its countryside. Additionally, like the Dutch, the 
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French had lost colonies to the Axis Power's conquests. Despite hopes for a quick 
recovery, dire problems confronted the French people for many years after the war. In 
the extended postwar period, the French were trying to simultaneously reestablish a 
national government, create some kind of viable economy that would provide subsistence 
to the population, and regain their former standing as a world power. Central to their 
national goals was the restoration of the old French Empire in Africa and Asia and at the 
center of the French imperial efforts during the Truman administration were the colonies 
in Indochina?90 Shortly after the end of the war, French administrators and soldiers 
began to filter back into the colonies while Allied forces looked on. At the same time, 
many in Washington hoped the situation would somehow resolve itself without direct 
United States inference. 291 
The greatest argument that Truman had pro-colonial tendencies was the United States 
policy concerning French colonial efforts in Indochina.292 During the first years of the 
postwar period, the Truman administration's response to France's return to Indochina 
was mute. Part of the reason was a continuation by the Truman administration of 
Roosevelt's policy of putting off the problem ofIndochina independence until a more 
auspicious time. Another facet was that the United States lacked direct military 
involvement in the region. At the end of the war, the British military controlled the 
Theater of Operations where Indochina was located and other postwar issues occupied 
the Truman administration's attention more fully.293 Moreover, there was a fear within 
the United States government that if the United States pressed for immediate 
independence for the colonies in Indochina that the domestic politics within France might 
veer even more towards the Communist Party, which had already become the largest 
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party in France by 1946.294 The Truman administration's position on the issue was a 
middle-of-the road approach; they would not interfere with the French's return but would 
pressure France to establish a firm plan for the region's independence.295 As noted in the 
earlier dispatches from Ambassador Hurley, there was concern about colonial forces 
using issued Lend-Lease equipment. Yet, American military supplies were ubiquitous 
among the Allies so it would have been difficult for the United States to preclude their 
use from occurring.296 Nevertheless, the United States' official policy was that French 
colonial forces would receive no assistance. For example, there was a ban on "American 
flag vessels to carry troops or war material to Vietnam.,,297 
As the Cold War intensified in the late 1940s, the administration's decision not to 
pursue the divisive issue of Indochina independence received reinforcement since they 
were trying to secure French and British support for an anti-Soviet European coalition. 298 
Once again, Truman's position was in some ways similar to FDR's attitude when he 
chose alliance unity over the thorny Indochina problem. Additionally Truman, and others 
in the administration, perceived Indochina as a place where the French had been fighting, 
not nationalists, but rather "Communist Rebels" since the Allied occupation ended and 
the French returned to power in 1946.299 This anti-Communist vision no doubt prevented 
any positive response to the Soviet-tainted Ho Chi Minh's requests for aid, unlike the 
later United States' response to the nationalists in the Dutch colonies.30o According to 
Truman's memoirs, he feared a vast Soviet-sponsored scheme to seize control of all of 
Asia. He said, "After Korea, it would be Indo-China, then Hong Kong, then Malaya.,,301 
While opposing Communist-inspired nationalists, Truman and his administration 
never advocated that the French colonial rule should continue in perpetuity. The 
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pennanent solution envisioned was to end colonial rule and replace it with a nationalist 
government favorable to the United States. Acheson described the administration's 
policy "As we saw our role in Southeast Asia, it was to help toward solving the colonial-
nationalist conflict in a way that would satisfy nationalist aims and minimize the strain on 
our Western European allies.,,302 Acheson would later couple greater issues, obtaining 
French support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and efforts to restore Gennan 
military might, in exchange for United States support in Indochina.303 Nevertheless, by 
1950 the administration's idea of minimizing the strain on France would include direct 
American support to French forces in Indochina against an alleged Soviet-sponsored 
insurgency.304 This support, more than any thing else, has tied Truman to French 
colonialism. Yet, nothing indicates that this support intended to reestablish a pennanent 
French Empire in the region but rather served to oppose Communist imperialism305 and 
secure stability. Acheson said that United States intentions for the French " ... meant a 
much more rapid transfer of responsibility and authority to indigenous institutions than 
the French had in mind and .... Although these types of talks went on for three years, 
they had no effect and the drain on France continued until the effort failed in 1954.,,306 
Reinforcing this view ofa more active role for America in Indochina's stability was a 
1950 report generated by the State and Defense Departments that raised the issue of the 
economies and political stability of the Indochina and Indonesia regions. This joint 
report pointed out that for the area to recover from the war it needed stability and 
economic growth for the region's emerging nations rather than the closed markets found 
in Communist-dominated regions.307 This need ior open markets was especially true for 
Japan, which lacked the raw materials required to restore their economy. 
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The combined issues of communism. stability in the colonial regions, and the interests 
of allies no doubt drove Truman and his administration from a position of 
noninterference to a more active roll in ensuring the security of the colonies in Indochina. 
Moreover hindsight, as revealed by countless books and articles about the Vietnam War, 
has shown that Truman and his people failed to resolve the issue of Indochinese 
independence by convincing the French to be willing partners in real reform.308 For 
instance in 1949, the French promised to grant future independence to Vietnam, but only 
because they bowed to United States pressure.309 When working with France the Truman 
administration sought a nationalist solution to the Indochina problem rather than settling 
for a continuation of imperial power. The preferred solution was " ... France to fight the 
anti-communist war and win ... and ... when battlefield victory was assured to 
magnanimously withdraw from Indochina.,,310 The administration even viewed the "Bao 
Dai Solution" as a better alternative in Vietnam than colonial rule.3ll This French-
inspired solution convinced an ineffectual Emperor Bao Dai to return to Vietnam in 1949 
to serve as Head of State to a new government in South Vietnam.312 This change in 
Vietnam's colonial status was in no small measure a response by the French to the 
Truman administration's renewed pressure to resolve the nationalist problems.313 The 
grant of United States aid in the form of supplies, money, and personnel to Indochina in 
1950 immediately followed the French ratification of Vietnam's independence and 
Truman's recognition of the Bao Dai government.314 Until China fell to the Communists, 
along with other setbacks in 1949, the Truman administration had been reluctant to agree 
to the Bao Dai Solution. However, the official endorsement ofNSC-68's more militant 
containment policy, an ongoing Korean War and tougher anti-communism rhetoric 
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throughout the government in 1950 overrode earlier anti-colonial considerations. 
Therefore, Truman and his aides felt that they had little choice other than to support the 
Boa Dai government.315 Still, the ill-advised recognition ofBao Dai and the grant of aid 
in 1950 were more representative of the Cold War policy to contain communism than a 




Harry Truman is a subject well worth studying since he was in a unique position to 
establish the underpinnings of a national containment policy that lasted throughout the 
decades-long conflict with the USSR. Moreover, he was the first to handle the diverse 
facets of that late twentieth century global contest which included a massive arms race, 
proliferation of defensive alliances, proxy wars, economic warfare, and propaganda wars. 
As a result, historians have made a thorough and detailed study of Truman's response to 
the challenges in the period after the Second World War. 
The following conclusion is similar to the blending of ideas found in the Post-
revisionism school, in that it supports elements from the two earlier schools of thought 
regarding Cold War history, the Traditional and the Revisionist. First, bolstering the 
traditional view is the fact that Truman espoused the ideals of independence and self-rule 
for colonies and pushed for those goals where possible, whereas the Communists 
practiced a different type of subjugation of native peoples. On the other hand, the 
revisionists appear correct in contending that national security goals ultimately won out 
over universalism. Roosevelt and Truman's ideology advocated the end of colonialism 
but concerns about maintaining the military alliance in World War Two, and containing 
communism during the Cold War, impeded the advancement of independence for the 
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European colonies. 
Another subject of interest, though not studied as extensively as the Cold War, was 
Truman's management of the repercussions caused by the decaying European empires. 
The analysis included Truman's private correspondence, public rhetoric and actual 
policies employed when dealing with the Europeans. Specifically, the paper studied 
Truman's attempts to either advance or undermine the European empires' colonial 
control. A different feature of the inquiry was the attempt to determine the consistency of 
the administration's foreign policy on the issue of Europe's external colonies. The last 
aspect considered was the connection between Truman's personal beliefs about 
colonialism and his administration's conduct of foreign affairs. These were the main 
issues examined and the search for their answers required scrutinizing many different 
areas of research. 
The methodology used to study Truman must position him within the greater context 
of his times. The analysis must consider the ongoing war activities at the time of his 
elevation to President, the existing state of the European empires, the anti-colonial legacy 
of Roosevelt and the changes occurring in the postwar world. While examining these 
factors in an attempt to obtain a clear sense of Truman's point of view concerning the 
world in general, and colonialism in particular, it became obvious that the study needed 
to include Truman's closest foreign policy advisors. The ultimate determination of this 
research and analysis is that Truman was in fact opposed to colonial rule in both word 
and deed though events later in his Presidency caused his administration to implement 
policies that contained a pro-colonial flavor. 
The following summation of supporting observations will help amplify the thesis 
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about Truman's animosity to the institution of colonialism and the idea of imperialism. 
First, despite the large volume ofinfonnation about FDR's position of profound 
condemnation for colonialism questions still exist about what his future intentions were 
in light of his equivocation on the return of France to Indochina. Historians agree that 
Roosevelt left no clear guidance for Truman and therefore it is difficult to know with any 
degree of certainty whether Truman deviated from FDR's desired end state with respect 
to colonialism. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that Roosevelt practiced an overall anti-
colonial policy within the constraints of other, more important, foreign policy objectives 
such as winning the war and maintaining the indispensable coalition of allied nations. 
This reasoning coincides with the conclusions arrived at by Hess, Miscamble and 
Thomas in their books. Despite the absence of clear guidance and different management 
styles, the two Presidents shared similar philosophical outlooks on the evils of 
imperialism and the need for a world organization of nations to resolve problems without 
conflict. This philosophy was the guiding light of Truman's anti-colonial policies; yet 
the environment in which Truman found himself was far from static. 
The condition of the world in the postwar period was different from what FDR had 
faced just months before. Britain and the nations of Western Europe were far frailer than 
anyone in the United States would have believed possible. Instead of the European 
empires again becoming dominant players in world politics, as they had been before the 
war, postwar Britain and Europe required American support just to keep from sliding into 
chaos. Indeed the world economy was in such dire circumstances and the financial 
weaknesses of Europe so great that together they threatened any real future economic 
progress. Additionally, the increasing volatility and calls for nationalism in regions of 
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underdeveloped countries made the continuation of European rule unlikely in the eyes of 
many. The realization of European decline crystallized in the United States when 
Churchill, whom many had called the defender of the British Empire, failed to win 
reelection and had to leave office. The newly empowered Labour Party then spent the 
next seven years downsizing the British Empire. Many people had a sense that FOR's 
efforts had succeeded and that the tipping point for the demise of imperial colonialism 
had happened. President Truman certainly felt this way and his speeches referred to the 
empires as outdated and not relevant to the modern world. He even said that it was a " ... 
historic fact that colonialism had run its course and could no longer be made to work for 
a few favored nations."! Close on the heels of this idea was the realization that if the 
process was not approached in a controlled, systemic manner it could lead to anarchy in 
the underdeveloped regions of the world. 
The recognition that the European powers were alarmingly weak impacted America's 
evolving Cold War foreign policy. Truman and his administration needed to keep the 
United States allies strong enough to confront communism in many regions of the world, 
which meant the issue of independence for colonies assumed a position of lesser 
importance. Truman relied upon his advisors and preferred thoughtful interaction and 
consensus building when making foreign policy decisions. With the exception of Eleanor 
Roosevelt, few Truman advisors granted ending colonialism a higher priority than 
maintaining regional stability that was first good for trade and later benefited the conduct 
of the greater Cold War. The primary colonial issue was the opening of markets to 
American trade, particularly in the vast British Empire, which the State Department 
worked hard at during most of the administration. This concern, breaking down 
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economic barriers and forcing the opening of markets, is consistent with LaFeber and 
Ferrell's assertion that closed markets are antithetical to American foreign policy. The 
Truman State Department was Euro-centric and largely supported the British and French 
Empires, and lesser European colonial holders, yet this same apparatus still possessed 
FDR's anti-colonial mindset and pushed these same countries to develop long term plans 
to divest themselves of colonial holdings. Therefore, the fact that Truman's advisors 
were Anglophiles was not as big an influence in dealings with the British as implied in 
Isaacson and Thomas' book. Even the Department of Defense's push to keep control of 
the Pacific islands did not reflect a desire to establish a colonial structure in the manner of 
the European empires. Rather, their focus was limited to the concepts of military 
presence, basing, lines of communication, tactical tripwires and strategic reach. 
Truman's rhetoric, as witnessed by his memoirs, correspondence, and public speeches, 
demonstrated that he personally opposed colonialism. As he said so succinctly, "I had 
always been opposed to colonialism.,,2 If considered from an oratory perspective Truman 
was no doubt anti-colonial and anti-imperial. If one contemplates his foreign policy 
decisions with respect to the United Nations, Philippine independence, the Trusteeship 
Program, the Point Four Program, the attempts to open British colonial markets and the 
efforts to end Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia, one can find a clear trend against 
European imperialism. In the case of France, Truman's early position was middle-of-the-
road due in part to the mindset that European colonialism was dying a natural death and 
the hope that the problem would resolve itself without direct United States inference. 
After all, even FDR had believed that the transition from colony to independent nation 
would take many years if not decades. Problems arose when the Cold War devolved into 
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a clash of surrogates and with France's intransigent insistence upon a system of colonial 
rule. Still, Truman's actions do not indicate that he wanted to maintain colonialism but, 
rather, that the Cold War's crisis management overshadowed the issue of independence 
for the region. Truman's choices are analogous to FOR's earlier decisions to curb anti-
colonial policies in order to pursue greater wartime goals. Truman firmly believed that 
colonialism was ending and he judged that the growth of world instability, the need to 
ensure access to strategic resources, and the fight to curb Communist imperialism were 
the new dangers for the future. 
Many historians and authors have noted that the Cold War changed everything in the 
way of foreign policy to include priorities. American foreign policy beyond a doubt 
underwent a fundamental change as conduct of the Cold War overwhelmed all other 
considerations for the United States. Truman went so far as to transform the issue of the 
imperialism and anti-colonialism of the old world order into Cold War rhetoric. The idea 
of colonialism was anathema to American ideals and Communists' forays into the 
underdeveloped parts of the world faced condemnation in much the same way that the 
outmoded concept of European colonialism had previously. Truman's speeches were a 
rallying cry for the United States public; communism was the new, malevolent form of 
imperialism and Americans must be steadfast in opposition in the name of democracy. 
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